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THE NEW FACE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE EPA’S NEW
TMDL RULES
JAMES BOYD*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The United States is on the brink of a new era in water quality
regulation. Newly-finalized total maximum daily load (TMDL) rules
are bringing to life a long-dormant approach to the identification,
prioritization, and repair of the nation’s polluted waters that promises
to expand the gains in water quality secured by the Clean Water Act’s
first twenty-five years.1  Despite progress under the Clean Water Act
(CWA), pollution or some form of habitat degradation continues to
afflict thirty-six percent of surveyed river miles.2  Moreover, of the na-
tion’s impaired rivers and streams, less than ten percent are impaired
primarily or secondarily by industrial point sources – the Act’s princi-
pal early target for pollution reductions along with municipal sewage
treatment.3  These stark realities – along with an abundance of litiga-
tion directed at the agency – have prompted the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to explore the potential of the Clean Water
Act’s section 303(d) to promote a wide variety of new actions to pro-
tect the nation’s waters.
A long-neglected part of the Clean Water Act (CWA), section
303(d) requires states to identify waters that are not in compliance
with water quality standards, establish priorities, and implement im-
provements.  Based in part upon the recommendations of a Federal
* Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.  Please direct questions or com-
ments to boyd@rff.org.  This article is also available at <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/
10DELPFBoyd>.
1. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).  For 1977 amendments to the Act, see Clean Water
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
2. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA, EPA 841-F-97-003, REPORT BROCHURE:
NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY:  1996 REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1998) (according to
states’ 1996 reporting under section 305(b) of the Clean Water Act); see also OFFICE OF
WATER, U.S. EPA, THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION’S WATER <http:www.epa.gov/305b> (last
modified July 16, 1998) (providing a summary of the 1996 Report to Congress).
3. See NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note 2, at 2.
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Advisory Committee convened in 1996, the EPA issued proposed
rules for implementation of the TMDL program in 1999.4 Amid sub-
stantial controversy the final rule was published in July, 2000.5
The TMDL rule explains that “[t]he TMDL specifies the amount
of a particular pollutant that may be present in a waterbody, allocates
allowable pollutant loads among sources, and provides the basis for
attaining or maintaining water quality standards.”6  Within this de-
scription lies a significant shift in the way water quality is regulated.
Instead of the technology-based, end-of-pipe approach to point
sources that has characterized CWA enforcement to date, the TMDL
program promises an “ambient” approach to water monitoring and
standards.  That is, instead of a focus on releases from known sources
of water pollution (i.e., monitoring discharges from discrete, identifi-
able pollution sources), regulation and reporting will increasingly be
concerned with the in situ quality of waterbodies themselves.  While
this sounds like simple common sense, an ambient approach to water
quality enforcement is largely untried.7  For a variety of mostly prag-
matic reasons, federal and state programs have focused on the regula-
4. See U.S. EPA, EPA 100-R-98-006, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM 25-43 (1998) [hereinafter FAC];
Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg.
46,012 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 130) (proposed Aug. 23 1999); Revisions to the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and Federal Antidegradation Policy
In Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed.
Reg. 46,058 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122, 123, 124, 131) (proposed Aug. 23, 1999).
5. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions
to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (2000) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, and 130) (Jul. 13 2000).  The rule’s introduction has been
controversial, not only because of its significant implications for a broad range of potentially
regulated entities, but for procedural reasons as well.  In June, Congress passed an emergency
spending bill with a rider that would have blocked EPA actions necessary to finalize the rule.  In
response, EPA published the final rule only a few hours before the spending bill was signed by
the President, thus thwarting the Congressional maneuver. See Cheryl Hogue, Muddied Waters:
EPA Issues Controversial Rule, But Will Congress Stop Implementation?, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS,
August 28, 2000, at 19-20; Susan Bruninga, TMDL Rulemaking Would be Thwarted Under Spe-
cial Funding Bill OK’d by Congress, 31 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1427.
6. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. at 46,013.
7. Interestingly,  statutory approaches that pre-date the Clean Water Act, such as the Wa-
ter Quality Act of 1965, called for ambient water quality standards and state-driven implemen-
tation plans.  For an overview of this early history, see ALLEN KNEESE & CHARLES SCHULTZE,
POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 30-50 (1975).  The failure of these earlier ap-
proaches to water quality regulation are a cautionary tale.  See EPA v. California ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (addressing the difficulty of translating
ambient water quality standards into standards that can control the conduct of specific pollut-
ers).
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tion of point sources via technology-based standards to secure efflu-
ent reductions.  But the low-hanging fruit of low-cost, high-volume
point source reductions has largely been harvested.  Today, signifi-
cant water quality improvement requires the expansion of controls to
nonpoint sources of pollution.
While the rules have significant implications for point sources,
the TMDL program’s impact on nonpoint source regulation is its
most important characteristic.  Because ambient monitoring will find
a large number of the nation’s waterbodies to be impaired, and be-
cause nonpoint sources are a primary cause of that impairment,
TMDLs will change the politics, economics, and implementation of
water quality regulation.
This article provides a description and critical review of the
EPA’s TMDL rules.  The analysis is not critical of the overall move-
ment toward this type of regulatory approach.  In fact, TMDL-based
rules should be thought of as an inevitable step toward a mature
phase of regulation in which all sources of water quality degradation
are addressed.  However, the review is critical in the sense that it
takes a sober view of the significant challenges facing regulators.  Af-
ter all, there is a reason nonpoint sources have largely escaped regula-
tion over the last twenty-five years.  Federal authority to mandate
nonpoint source controls remains weak.  Implementation of the ana-
lytic tools required by the TMDL process will be costly and difficult.
And conflicts are almost certain to arise due to the geographically in-
terrelated nature of pollution sources and legal jurisdictions.  Also,
the new rules explicitly create incentives for pollutant trading across
point sources and nonpoint sources. According to the new rules,
“EPA is seeking to establish a market for pollutant trading, in the
hopes of creating more effective and efficient mechanisms for restor-
ing water quality.”8 While laudable as a means to promote flexible,
cost-effective discharge controls, water quality trading should be rec-
ognized as a tall order with numerous barriers to implementation.
This article does not address the debate over the CWA’s net so-
cial benefits.9 Rather, it takes the CWA’s legal requirements as given
8. Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and Fed-
eral Antidegradation Policy In Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Man-
agement Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,068.
9. This issue has received significant attention from economists and from the EPA.   Many
studies find that the incremental costs of CWA rules exceed their benefits, as measured by will-
ingness to pay for improved water quality.   For an analysis of this issue, see Randolph Lyon &
Scott Farrow, An Economic Analysis of Clean Water Act Issues, 31 WATER RESOURCES RES.
213 (1995).  See also OFF. OF WATER, U.S. EPA, EPA 800-R-94-002, PRESIDENT CLINTON’S
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and considers the economic implications of movement toward a
TMDL-driven regulatory system.  Part II provides an overview of
current water quality conditions, the history of the TMDL Program’s
development, and a brief description of the rules.  Part III turns to a
detailed description of completed TMDLs.  Part IV explores a set of
legal and economic challenges presented by the program’s future im-
plementation and makes recommendations for the ways in which the
program can be made most effective.  Part V considers the difficulties
associated with water quality trading.  The article concludes with a
summary of the challenges facing the TMDL program.
II.  TMDL PROGRAM BACKGROUND
The procedure by which water quality priorities are identified,
the process that assigns responsibility for improvements, and the eco-
nomic, political, and practical challenges of implementation, are all
changing. The history of Clean Water Act implementation – both its
successes and failures – helps to explain why the TMDL Program’s
time has come.
A.  The Clean Water Act’s Successes and Failures
Within ten years of the CWA’s passage, water scientists and
regulators reported significant improvements in water quality.  An
analysis of changes in water quality over the period 1974 to 1981
documented widespread reductions in lead and fecal bacteria concen-
trations, a reduction in industrial and municipal biological oxygen
demand loads of seventy-one percent and forty-six percent, respec-
tively, and some localized  improvements in measures of dissolved
oxygen deficit.10  To put the accomplishment in better perspective,
these gains were achieved  during a period when inflation-adjusted
GNP increased twenty-five percent.  The gains were largely due to
CWA-related expenditures for the improvement of municipal sewage
treatment.  Between 1970 and 1985 the fraction of the U.S. popula-
tion served by wastewater treatment jumped from forty-two percent
to seventy-four percent.11
In addition to improvements in municipal wastewater treatment,
technology-based standards for industrial point sources began to yield
CLEAN WATER INITIATIVE: ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS (1994).
10. See Richard A. Smith et al., Water Quality Trends in the Nation’s Rivers, 235 SCIENCE
1607, 1607-11 (1987).
11. See WORLD RESOURCES INST., WORLD RESOURCES 1992-1993, at 167 (1992).
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large improvements.  Starting in the early-1980s, point sources have
had to meet effluent limits consistent with a variety of technology-
based standards such as “best available technology economically
achievable.”12  Establishment of the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permitting system has brought report-
ing, penalty, and anti-backsliding provisions to the regulatory scheme.
Complementing this federal permit authority, section 505 of the
CWA enables citizens to file suit for compliance with NPDES permits
or EPA orders.13  Together, these enforcement tools have precipitated
significant reductions in industrial point source releases.  For in-
stance, between 1987 and 1990 toxic discharges to surface water fell
from 417 to 197 million pounds per year, according to Toxics Release
Inventory data.14  By setting limits on the discharge of more than sixty
pollutants, including organic pollutants and heavy metals, the EPA
Office of Water currently estimates that the program reduces conven-
tional pollutant discharges by 108 million pounds and toxic discharges
by twenty-four million pounds annually.15  A rough, but illustrative,
benchmark of these collective improvements is offered by the EPA:
“[i]n 1972, most estimates were that only thirty to forty percent of as-
sessed waters met water quality goals such as being safe for fishing
and swimming. Today, state monitoring data indicate that between
sixty to seventy percent of assessed waters meet state water quality
goals.”16
There is at least an academic consensus that the CWA is one of
the environmental movement’s success stories, due to its success in
motivating point sources controls.17  But to say that the CWA has im-
12. Compliance was phased in over a period of years, with the timing depending on the
source category and effluent classification.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1998).  The CWA’s citizen suit provisions are thought to have
been particularly effective, at least relative to their use under other statutes.  See Charles S.
Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act
Violates the Constitution’s Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1960 (1995).
For a more critical view of penalties under the CWA, see ROBERT ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN
WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 166-170 (1993).  For an analysis of whether citizen suits are
available in the context of water quality-based CWA violations, rather than permitting viola-
tions, see Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard En-
forcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 433-442 (1997).
14. However, the study in which these figures are cited is highly critical of the implementa-
tion of point source regulations under the CWA.  See ADLER ET AL., supra note 13, at 18.
15. See OFF. OF WATER, U.S. EPA, CLEAN WATER SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
<http://www.cleanwater.gov/action/c1a.html> (last modified Aug. 10, 1998).
16. Id.
17. See Drew Caputo, A Job half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10574, 10,575-578 (1997); see also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL
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proved water quality is not to say that further efforts are not indi-
cated.  In fact, the nation’s waters remain significantly polluted.18
Despite the CWA’s achievements, a sobering implication of the
above figures is that, while sixty to seventy percent of waters now
meet state standards, thirty to forty percent still fall short.  More spe-
cifically, according to the latest National Water Quality Inventory,
thirty-six percent of the rivers and streams surveyed were partially or
fully impaired, and water quality is “threatened” in an additional
eight percent.19 Of the surveyed lakes, thirty-nine percent were par-
tially or fully impaired, with water quality threatened in an additional
ten percent.20  For surveyed estuaries, thirty-eight percent are re-
ported to be partially or fully impaired, with water quality threatened
in an additional four percent.21  Casting the data somewhat differ-
ently, the States have identified more than 20,000 individual river
segments, lakes, and estuaries as polluted.  This amounts to 300,000
miles of river and five million acres of lakes classified as polluted.22
Rank Rivers Lakes Estuaries
1 Agriculture Agriculture Industrial discharges
2 Municipal Point
Sources
Unspecified
Nonpoint Sources
Urban Runoff/
Storm Sewers
3 Hydrologic
Modification
Atmospheric
Deposition
Municipal Point
Sources
4 Habitat
Modification
Urban Runoff/
Storm Sewers
Upstream Sources
5 Resource
Extraction
Municipal Point
Sources
Agriculture
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 873-876 (1996).
18. When it comes to overall water quality and the water quality-based regulations in the
CWA, critics can be quite blunt. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 13, at 395 (“[E]valuated from a va-
riety of perspectives, the enforcement of the water quality-based system of pollution control
must be viewed as a failure.”).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See REPORT BROCHURE: NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 1996 REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 6.  The surveys covered nineteen percent of all stream miles, forty
percent of all lake acres, and seventy-two percent of all estuarine waters.
22. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL)
PROGRAM (Aug. 1999) <www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/tmdlfs.html> (last modified Aug. 13 1999).
BOYD_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 04/17/01  1:19 PM
Fall 2000] NEW FACE OF THE CWA:  EPA’S NEW TMDL RULES 45
The data strongly suggest that improvements in water quality
were disproportionately due to regulation of point sources.23  There is
now widespread recognition that nonpoint sources are of principal
concern.24 Consider the EPA’s most recent ranking of sources con-
tributing to water quality impairment;25 industrial sources, while pres-
ent on this list, clearly do not predominate.  Instead, a host of non-
point sources, particularly from urban and agricultural runoff, loom
large.26
Pesticide, fertilizer, and animal waste runoff from agriculture is
the single largest contributor to the impairment of rivers and lakes.
The private incentive of agriculture to ensure the largest yields via
perhaps excessive application of pesticides and fertilizers is a classic
example of an environmental externality, since much of the applica-
tion inevitably migrates into common resource waterbodies.27  Log-
ging and construction activities, many of them on federal lands, are a
significant source of sediment contamination, as runoff carries fine-
grained soils from roads and construction sites into lakes and
streams.28 In urban and suburban areas, watershed degradation is
closely tied to increased population density and residential and com-
mercial development.29 In such areas the relatively impermeable na-
ture of groundcover leads to rapid, unfiltered runoff from roadways
and parking lots, chemically treated lawns, and commercial estab-
lishments.30  Increased attention is also being given to atmospheric
23. See generally U.S. EPA, THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION’S WATER, OVERVIEW OF
STATES § 305(B) WATER QUALITY REPORTING FOR THE YEAR 1996 (1996) [herinafter THE
QUALITY OF OUR NATION’S WATER].
24. This is not only clear from water quality data, but in the pronounced shift in legal and
regulatory attention toward nonpoint sources.  Section IV describes these changes in more de-
tail.
25. See THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION’S WATER, supra note 23, at 13.
26. In common parlance, pollution from nonpoint sources is “runoff caused primarily by
rainfall around activities that employ or cause pollutants.”  United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,
599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979).
27. See generally ARUN MALIK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVE POLICIES: ISSUES IN THE
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (1992).
28. See J. Lynch & E. Corbett, Evaluation of Best Management Practices for Controlling
Nonpoint Pollution from Silvicultural Operations, 26 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 41, 41-52
(1990).
29. See generally WATER ENV’T FED’N AND THE AMERICAN SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS,
URBAN RUNOFF QUALITY MANAGEMENT (1998).
30. Compare the “rainfall allocation” for natural and urban groundcover.  With natural
groundcover, approximately forty percent evaporates, fifty percent infiltrates the soil, and ten
percent runs off.  In an urban setting thirty percent evaporates, fifteen percent infiltrates, and
fifty-five percent runs off.  See NORTHEASTERN ILL. PLANNING COMM’N, URBAN
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deposition, where pollutants from airborne dust and industrial and
commercial air emissions are absorbed by surface waters or precipi-
tated via rainfall.31  In the Northwest, elevated water temperatures are
having a negative impact on cold water salmon habitat.32  Finally, leg-
acy pollution (i.e., pollution no longer being discharged) collected in
sediments is a significant source of ongoing waterbody impairment.33
One of the reasons these sources are such a significant problem is
that they present serious implementation, monitoring, and enforce-
ment challenges.34  But the water quality problems they cause can no
longer be ignored, particularly given the significant reductions al-
ready secured from point sources.35  In this context, it is not surprising
that political and legal pressure is being applied to the EPA, and in
turn to the states, to make something of the regulatory potential con-
tained in the CWA’s TMDL provisions.
B.  The Changing Politics of Water Quality
The seeds of this shift in regulatory emphasis have been in place
since the Act’s passage in 1972.  Within section 303 lay provisions that
called for an ambient water-quality driven (rather than end-of-pipe)
approach to enforcement.  The section calls upon the states to iden-
tify waters for which the point source controls elsewhere in the Act
“are not stringent enough to implement any water quality standard
applicable to such waters.”36  States must prioritize any waters so
STORMWATER BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS  5 (1993).
31. The rules “explicitly include atmospheric deposition as a nonpoint source of pollut-
ants.”  Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 46,016.
32. Water temperature is viewed as a component of overall water quality.  See Tom Alkire,
Temperature Becoming Larger Issue for Northwest Dischargers, Official Says, 30 Env’t Rep.
(BNA) 795 (Aug. 20, 1999).
33. EPA estimates that 10 percent of the nation’s lakes, rivers, and bays have sediment
contaminated with toxic chemicals that can kill fish living in those waters or impair the health of
people and wildlife who eat contaminated fish.  See EPA’s Contaminated Sediment Management
Strategy, (visited October 10, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/ostwater/cs/stratefs.html>, citing U.S.
EPA, EPA 823-C-97-004 LISTING OF FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSUMPTION ADVISORIES (1997);
U.S. EPA, EPA 823-R-97-006–008 THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF SEDIMENT
CONTAMINATION IN SURFACE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES (1998).
34. For a broad overview of policies to control nonpoint sources, see Marc Ribaudo et al.,
Economics of Water Quality Protection From Nonpoint Sources: Theory and Practice, in U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE REP’T 782 (1999).
35. In the words of one observer, “unless TMDLs include quantified restrictions on non-
point sources, they are wasting everyone’s time.”  Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet:
The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,391, 10,401 (Aug. 1997).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1998).
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identified, based on analysis of use and severity of degradation, and
establish TMDLs sufficient to bring the waters into compliance.
Section 303 provisions were largely ignored by states and the
federal government during the first two decades of CWA enforce-
ment.37  But nonattainment of water quality goals and the desire to
bring more sources into the regulated sphere has led to a reexamina-
tion of the latent enforcement power contained in section 303.38  The
importance of the section is, first, that it requires state-wide assess-
ments and public documentation of water quality problems.  As the
public becomes aware of the “impaired” nature of the waters around
their communities, this reporting alone will provide motivation for
state regulatory efforts.  Second, the TMDLs themselves appear, at
least in principle, to imply that states must allocate pollutant load re-
ductions to sources not currently covered by load restrictions.  Since
load reductions have been wrung from point sources over a period of
twenty five years, and since the bulk of current impairment is due to
nonpoint sources, any state seeking further load reductions – at least
on a cost-benefit basis – will be led directly to nonpoint sources.  In
this way, the shift to ambient monitoring and standards almost neces-
sarily leads to a greater emphasis on nonpoint sources.
Enforcement of section 303 clearly alters the politics of load re-
duction.  The need to meet in situ water quality standards sets up a
state-by-state confrontation between well-organized industrial inter-
ests—which can claim to have already paid their pollution control
dues—and organized agricultural, silvicultural, and municipal inter-
ests that resist the “expansion” of CWA-driven requirements to their
hard-to-solve nonpoint problems.  An industrial and municipal con-
stituency for nonpoint source controls can already be detected.  Ac-
cording to the Director of  the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage
Agencies, “In the absence of nonpoint source controls, all these crite-
ria drive tighter standards.  All that’s left is tighter limits on per-
mits.”39  This scenario is obviously of great concern to current point
source permit holders.  A minority (dissenting) contribution to the
37. For a detailed analysis of the history of section 303 provisions in the context of the
CWA’s overall implementation, see Houck, supra note 35, at 10,391; Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs:
The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, [27
News and Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,329 (July 1997).
38. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 252, 259-262 (2d ed. 1994) for
a description of the important differences between technology-based, point source CWA en-
forcement and water quality-driven CWA enforcement.
39. Susan Bruninga, Clean Water Act: Chances for Clean Water Bill Dim; EPA to Use Ex-
isting Authorities on Nonpoint Sources, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at  S-18-19 (1999).
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Federal Advisory Committee Report by a municipality representative
and industrial source representative echoed the worry saying, “[i]t is
patently unfair to encourage states to impose further burdens on
point sources merely because of the absence of federal enforcement
authority over nonpoint sources.”40
The EPA’s authority to implement the new TMDL rules is not
accepted by all parties.  Even if the new rules are successfully prom-
ulgated, many opponents have not accepted the changes quietly.
Following publication of the proposed rule, members of a House sub-
committee criticized the EPA for not requesting Congress to enact
authorizing legislation in support of the TMDL program.41  Some ag-
ricultural interests argue that the proposed TMDL rules “illegally link
nonpoint source runoff to the federally dictated and enforceable
TMDL program” by reading the CWA to cover only waters impaired
by point sources.42  The EPA’s position is that the CWA provides am-
ple authority for the TMDL rules.43  In the Proposed Rule, the EPA
directly addresses the argument that they have no authority to regu-
late nonpoint sources.  “Section 319, a section that exclusively ad-
dresses nonpoint sources, provides clear evidence that Congress did
not intend to limit the term ‘pollutant’ to point sources.”44  If a state
fails to impose controls over an operation that is the source of an on-
going water impairment, the agency contends that the CWA provides
it with authority to step in and issue Best Management Practices
(BMPs) or other controls to reduce nonpoint pollution.45
40. FAC, supra note 4, at I-5.
41. See Susan Bruninga,  House Panel Members Question EPA Authority to Issue TMDL
Proposal, 30 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1241 (Nov. 5, 1999).
42. Susan Bruninga, Waters Impaired By Nonpoint Sources Would Be Listed, Draft TMDL
Rule Says, 30 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 519, 520 (July 16, 1999) (reporting argument presented in a
memorandum to the Office of Management and Budget from the National Pork Producers
Council, the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, and the American Crop Protection Asso-
ciation).
43. According to a recent federal district court ruling, non-point sources are covered under
the TMDL provisions of the CWA.  See Pronsolino v. Marcus, No. C 99-01828 WHA 1, 28 (N.D.
Cal., March 30, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/pronsdecision.pdf> (stating that “as to
whether TMDLs were authorized in the first place for all substandard rivers and waters, there is
no doubt.  They plainly were and remain so today – without regard to the sources of pollu-
tion.”).
44. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. at 46,021.  For a more detailed analysis of federal authority over nonpoint sources, see
discussion infra Section IV.1.
45. See Bruninga, supra note 39, at 1241 (testimony of Chuck Fox, EPA assistant adminis-
trator for water); see also Houck, supra note 35, at 10,401.
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C.  Litigation
The direct impetus for the new focus on section 303 was a series
of court cases beginning in the late 1980s that challenged the EPA’s
oversight of the states’ responsibilities.  Until very recently, most
states had failed to submit their assessments of polluted waters (if
those assessments even existed at all), and had therefore failed to en-
gage in the prioritization of waters for cleanup, promulgation of
TMDLs, and implementation of associated discharge controls called
for under section 303.  The history of this litigation has been usefully
summarized by the EPA and  others.46  As of late 1999, the EPA is
under court order in seventeen states to establish TMDLS if the
states fail to do so.  In fourteen other states, claims have been filed
(or notice has been given of intent to file) seeking to compel the EPA
to establish TMDLs.47
The Federal Advisory Committee and the new rules are a direct
outgrowth of this litigation.48  The litigation has also had an immedi-
ate effect on the states’ assessment and reporting of impaired waters.
Idaho Sportsmen’s Coalition v. Browner is illustrative.49  As of 1989,
Idaho had submitted no list of “water quality limited segments”
(WQLSs).  As of 1992 the state had a list, but one with only thirty-six
listed WQLSs.  Using a “constructive submission” theory, the court
found the EPA’s approval of Idaho’s compliance with section 303 to
be arbitrary and contrary to law.  Under court order, the EPA has
since approved a list identifying 962 Idaho WQLSs.  All states and
territories have now at least submitted a list, with full EPA approval
secured by thirty-eight states.50
46. See OFF. OF WATER, U.S. EPA, TMDL LITIGATION BY STATE (Sept. 1, 1999)
<www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/lawsuit1.html> (last modified Sept. 8, 1999); see also Houck, supra
note 37, at 10,344 (“By and large, they [the states] did not do anything called for under § 303(d)
. . . . They did not do it in the 1970s.  They did not do it in the 1980s.  They did not do it at the
outset of the 1990s, nor did EPA—until a series of citizen suits rocked EPA and the states into a
hasty rereading of § 303(d) and the current scramble to comply.”).
47. For cases establishing the failure of a state to meaningfully or fully submit the required
section 303(d) lists and need to develop TMDLs, see Alaska Ctr for the Env’t v. Browner, 20
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Sierra Club  v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996).  For con-
sent decrees or settlement agreements, see American Littoral Socy. v. EPA, 943 F. Supp 548
(E.D. Pa. 1996)); Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp 1342 (D. Ariz. 1995).
48. See FAC, supra note 4; Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Man-
agement Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,012; Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Program and Federal Antidegradation Policy In Support of Revisions to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,058.
49. See Idaho Sportsmen’s Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962, 964 (W.D. Wash. 1996)
(describing the case’s procedural history).
50. It is important to note that these are lists of impaired waters, not the states’ final
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D.  Brief Overview of the Enacted Rules
The revisions to the EPA’s TMDL rules provide more specificity
and structure to the operation of the program.  The rules lay out a ba-
sic set of requirements for the states, including:
• Which waters are listed.  While it is largely up to an individual
state to determine which waters are impaired, relative to its own wa-
ter quality standards, the rules require public review of the proce-
dures by which a state generates its list.51  And EPA has final approval
authority over listings and the methodologies used to derive them.
According to the rules, the EPA’s view is that “the section 303(d) list
should serve as a comprehensive public accounting of all waterbodies
impaired or threatened by pollution and pollutants, irrespective of the
tool or mechanism being used to achieve standards.”52
• A format for listing and the assignment of priorities.  The states
are required to rank waters by their degree of impairment, assign wa-
ters on the list to categories that reflect their priority and progress
toward meeting standards, and develop a “prioritized schedule” for
attainment.53  Impaired waterbodies designated as public drinking wa-
ter supplies and those whose water quality poses a threat to species
listed under the Endangered Species Act, must be designated as high
priority.54  Apart from that, the states are allowed discretion, subject
to federal oversight.  A range of factors may be considered in the de-
velopment of the priority rankings.  “These factors include immediate
programmatic needs, vulnerability of particular waterbodies as
aquatic habitats, recreational, economic and aesthetic importance of
particular waterbodies, degree of public interest and support, and
State, Territorial, authorized Tribal, or national policies and priori-
ties.”55
TMDL plans.
51. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions
to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,603.
52. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. at 46,025.  States have latitude to determine the geographic scope of a waterbody or
segment that is listed.  Listing can relate to an entire basin or individual stream segments.  There
is a tradeoff here.  Too large an area may overwhelm the regulator’s ability to monitor, evalu-
ate, and implement a plan effectively.  Too small an area may fail to account for all of the
sources contributing to a problem.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 130.27 (2000).
54. See Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
64 Fed. Reg. at 46,026.
55. Id. at 46,025.
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• Timelines.  States are required to establish TMDLs for all wa-
terbodies within ten years.56 TMDLs for waterbodies listed as “high
priority” should be established first.57
• The implementation of TMDLs themselves.  All TMDLs must
identify the pollutants contributing to impairment, and establish the
load reductions, including a margin of safety, necessary to bring the
water into compliance.  The TMDL must also identify pollutant
sources, including nonpoint sources.  In addition, the TMDL must
feature an implementation plan, with a list and timeline for actions,
including monitoring and verification of compliance.  The implemen-
tation plan also includes an “allocation” of load reductions to differ-
ent sources.58  Local conditions – ecological, political, and economic –
will be allowed to determine the nature of the allocation.  According
to the rule, TMDLs “provide for tradeoffs between alternative point
and nonpoint source control options so that cost effectiveness, techni-
cal effectiveness, and the social and economic benefits of different
allocations can be considered by decision-makers.”59
State-level TMDL development, particularly the allocation of
load reductions, is likely to spur a host of innovative approaches to
pollutant load reductions by drawing new sources and trading mecha-
nisms into new control systems.  But, to complement this many-
flowers-will-bloom flexibility, the new rules codify a set of require-
ments meant to guarantee meaningful and comparable state initia-
tives.
The rules are analyzed in more detail below.60  While still subject
to significant implementation questions, the rules should nevertheless
56. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions
to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,591.  The final
regulations require TMDLs to be established by July 2010.  An additional five years will be
granted if a state can show the ten year deadline is “not practicable.”
57. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. at 46,050.
58. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions
to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,597-600.
59. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. at 46,030.
60. The proposed TMDL rules were accompanied by proposed changes to the NPDES
permitting system for point sources.  These rules, which were dropped in the final version, in-
cluded new point source offset requirements and re-classification of certain large animal feed-
ing, aquatic animal production, and certain forestry operations as point sources.  For discussion
of these rules, and reasons for their exclusion, see Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and
Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
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be recognized as a significant new development in the nation’s ap-
proach to water quality improvement.
III.  COMPLETED TMDLS:  AN ILLUSTRATION
In response to the threat of litigation, or under court order, a
number of states have moved forward with the development of load-
ing standards for priority impaired water segments.61  We now de-
scribe Oregon’s Columbia Slough TMDLs in order to concretely illus-
trate the components and practical implications of a TMDL analysis
and plan.62  The Columbia Slough TMDLs should not necessarily be
viewed as representative of TMDLs generally, since the problems and
solutions identified in TMDL planning are highly idiosyncratic to
their location.  The case has been selected because it involves a com-
plex set of impairments and includes detailed analysis and concrete
implementation plans by the state.  In fact, the Columbia Slough
TMDLs are notably specific in their description of the enforcement
and implementation tools that will be employed to achieve water
quality improvements.
A.  Columbia Slough TMDLs
Once impairments are identified through the listing process,
TMDL planning focuses on the identification of pollutant sources, the
allocation of responsibility for source reductions, and implementation
and enforcement of the allocations.  These steps are illustrated in the
following case description.
Columbia Slough is a roughly nineteen mile long collection of
mostly shallow water channels located on the Columbia River’s
floodplain near Portland.  A variety of land uses – industrial, residen-
tial, and agricultural – occurs in the 40,000 acre area that drains into
the Slough.63  The geographic scope of the TMDL was determined
largely by hydrological characteristics such as drainage areas and tidal
Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
65 Fed. Reg. at 43,639-52.
61. Among others, California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, North Carolina,
Delaware, and Oregon have completed EPA-approved TMDLs for some of their state’s im-
paired water segments.  See Total Maximum Daily Load Program, (visited October 11, 2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/>.
62. See OREGON DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, COLUMBIA SLOUGH TMDLs (1998) (visited
Mar. 21, 2000) <http://waterquality.deq.state.or.us/wq/TMDLs/TMDLs.htm.> [hereinafter
CSTMDL].
63. See id. at 4.
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flows.  The TMDLs for Columbia Slough were approved by the EPA
in November, 1998.64
1.  How Are Water Quality Problems Identified?
The first step in the TMDL process is the listing of a waterbody
as impaired.  This process identifies the category of impairment (e.g.,
excessive algae or lead) and compares existing conditions to the rele-
vant water quality standard.  Impairment is determined according to
criteria established and documented by the state.65 These criteria de-
scribe the standards for each category of impairment, the data re-
quired for analysis, and guidelines to ensure the quality of data analy-
sis.66
As an example, consider the state’s framework for determining
chlorophyll a impairment.  The beneficial uses affected by impair-
ment include water contact recreation, aesthetics, fishing, water sup-
ply, and livestock watering.  The standards are expressed as numeric
concentrations (e.g., mg/l).67  Water quality is considered limited, and
thus subject to listing, if the 3-month average exceeds the numeric
standard.68  Data used for the 1998 listing of waterbodies come from a
variety of sources, including Oregon DEQ itself, as well as contrac-
tors and federal agencies.  Standards and data vary by pollutant.  For
example, fish or shellfish consumption advisories issued by the Ore-
gon State Health Division indicate impairment from toxic pollutants.69
The Columbia Slough was placed on the Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality’s section 303(d) list due to a variety of im-
pairments.  The Slough was found to be in violation of standards for
chlorophyll a, dissolved oxygen, pH, phosphorus, bacteria, and a
range of toxic pollutants, including lead, dioxin, and PCBs.  These
pollutants individually threaten one or more beneficial uses of the wa-
terbody including recreational fishing, boating, swimming, or support
of aquatic life.  Water column, fish tissue, and sediment data were
64. See STATE OF OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD
DOCUMENTS, (visited September 24, 2000) <http://waterquality.deq.state.or.us/wq/TMDLs/
TMDLs.htm> [hereinafter OR. TMDL DOCUMENTS].
65. See OREGON DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, LISTING CRITERIA FOR OREGON’S 1998
303(D) LIST OF WATER QUALITY LIMITED WATER BODIES (1998).
66. See  Oregon Water Quality Standards, described in OR. ADMIN. R. 340-41 (2000).
67. See OR. ADMIN. R. 340-41, supra note 66 (specifying such standards for individual ba-
sins in the state).
68. See id.  There is a required minimum of 5 representative data points per sampling site,
collected on separate days during the peak algal growing season.
69. See OR. ADMIN. R. 340-41-445(2)(p).
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used to identify the Slough as impaired.  This data came from a vari-
ety of sources, including metropolitan agencies, the City of Portland
Bureau of Environmental Services, Portland State University, and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Historically, moni-
toring of the waterbody has been conducted only “sporadically,” ac-
cording to the DEQ.70
The Columbia Slough case highlights the value of the listing pro-
cess.  As of 1998, Portland residents can refer to a readily available
state analysis of a local waterbody that provides a range of recrea-
tional, aesthetic, and commercial values.  That the waterbody suffers
from ten distinct forms of impairment is an easily comprehended and
presumably politically salient piece of information.71  Moreover, the
listing process also promotes higher quality and more consistent data
collection and analysis.
2.  How are Sources and Their Contributions to Impairment
Identified?
With knowledge of impairment, states must design TMDLs that
provide a defensible plan for source reductions to bring the water-
body into attainment.72 This requires knowledge of sources and the
pathways by which pollutants are transported and deposited into the
waterbody.  Identification of sources and pathways requires a kind of
holistic accounting exercise.  To construct a source inventory, states
will typically survey permitted sources (industrial and municipal point
sources) and inventory land uses in the water body’s drainage area to
identify nonpoint sources, such as agricultural and urban runoff.  In
some cases, source identification requires the equivalent of detective
work  to connect ambient conditions with specific sources.  For exam-
ple, severe oxygen depletion was detected in the Slough following a
large winter storm.  This suggested that a source of impairment was
airplane de-icing chemicals that ran into the Slough from Portland In-
ternational Airport.  In another case, elevated bacteria levels “sub-
stantially higher than those predicted via modeling” have directed at-
tention toward the detection of illicit discharges.73
70. See CSTMDL, supra note 62, at 5.
71. See OR. TMDL DOCUMENTS, supra note 64.  Like the Toxics Release Inventory, the
provision of information relating to pollutant discharges alone may yield environmental bene-
fits.  Local political pressure on pollutant sources may be provoked by such listing.  At a na-
tional level, this kind of reporting also gives environmental advocates a useful way to compare
and judge the performance of regulators and source categories.
72. See supra Part I.D.
73. CSTMDL, supra note 62, at 28.
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In addition to source identification, the TMDL must estimate the
effect of source reductions and other control activities on the Slough’s
water quality.  In some cases, this process is straightforward.  For ex-
ample, an already permitted point source may discharge directly into
the waterbody.  If so, the source, transport and deposition mechanism
and contribution to loadings in the receiving waterbody are already
known.  In general, however, TMDLs will be geared toward water-
bodies with multiple sources that migrate and enter the waterbody via
a diverse set of pathways.  Understanding the contribution of a par-
ticular source to loadings in this more general set of cases is a signifi-
cant technical challenge.
Sources of impairment in Columbia Slough include a complex
mix of sewer overflows, urban runoff, landfill leachate, industrial dis-
charges, sediments, and agricultural runoff.74  The complexity of
making source determinations is compounded by a variety of interac-
tions between ground and surface water, weather events, tempera-
ture, and water quality.75  For this reason, source contributions are
rarely known with certainty.  Instead, the regulator must rely on
models that attempt to capture the factors that affect the transport,
deposition, and ultimate fate of pollutants in the waterbody.
The models used are determined by the type of data available
and the nature of the system being described.  For instance, stormwa-
ter discharges can be monitored for lead.  This provides a rough
gauge of the amount of lead deposition due to urban runoff.  In turn,
contributions to urban runoff by categories of sources can be esti-
mated by modeling.  Concretely, the land area in the drainage area
occupied by industrial facilities or roadways can be used to estimate
the fraction of lead runoff from those sources.  The Columbia Slough
TMDL includes a particularly detailed analysis of lead loadings.  In-
dividual industrial, stormwater, and sewer point source permit hold-
ers have been identified and their lead discharges assessed.  In addi-
tion, an analysis was performed to determine lead contributions by
land use category.  For each category, including residential, industrial,
commercial, parks, and traffic corridor, the land area was calculated
and the lead load (in pounds per year) was estimated.76  Consider the
model used to calculate these loads for a single land use category:
The contribution of lead from permitted industrial sites is calcu-
lated using the following equation: (Area x Annual Rainfall x Run-
74. See id. at 4.
75. See generally STEVEN CHAPRA, SURFACE WATER QUALITY MODELING (1997).
76. See CSTMDL, supra note 62, app. A, at A-15.
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off Coefficient x Pollutant Concentration = Annual Pollutant
Load).  The annual rainfall for the watershed is given in Table 3-12
of the Portland MS4 permit application as 34.3 inches per year, and
the runoff coefficient for industrial areas is given in Table 3-13 as
0.68.77
This example highlights the data requirements and assumptions
that go into calculating a single number in a single analysis that is a
component of a much larger evaluation of sources and relative pollut-
ant contributions.
The modeling techniques and data required for TMDL imple-
mentation pose a significant challenge.  Accordingly, they also con-
tribute significantly to the costs of implementation.78  Some simplicity
and cost savings will undoubtedly be possible as states become more
practiced in TMDL development – and as more resources are de-
voted to the development of data and models for use in this kind of
program.  However, the degree to which data sources and modeling
techniques can be standardized is limited.  Each listed water segment
is unique in its hydrology, transport pathways, pollutant sources, etc.
TMDL development will invariably involve some site-specific analysis
(even if the point of the analysis is simply to show that some set of
standard data and techniques is applicable to the waterbody).
As an example of the site-specific nature of this analysis, con-
sider the Columbia Slough TMDL approach to excessive nutrient
loadings.  Because “point source loads are minor,”79 the search for
source reductions involves groundwater controls, such as the installa-
tion of sanitary sewers.  However, because the effect of these reduc-
tions is extremely delayed and “uncertain,”80 the plan calls for
changes in channel and stream flow.  The recommended changes are
based on a site-specific analysis of natural flows, temperature, time of
year, expected algae growth and flow management techniques avail-
able in the drainage area.  The applicability of general modeling tech-
niques to this kind of problem is limited.
77. Id.
78. An EPA study of TMDL costs identified modeling and data collection (monitoring)
costs as the most significant contributors to the costs of TMDL implementation.  The study of
fourteen completed TMDLs found that development costs ranged from 4,000 to more than a
million dollars.  Eight of the fourteen cost more than $100,000.  See OFF. OF WATER, U.S. EPA,
EPA 841-R-96-001, TMDL DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATES: CASE STUDIES OF 14 TMDLS
(1996).
79. See CSTMDL, supra note 62, at 14.
80. See id. at 24.  The report suggests that it will take thirty years to achieve a forty percent
reduction in groundwater nitrogen.  See id.
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For Columbia Slough, the extent of documentation related to
data, analysis, and methods is exemplary, as is the sophistication of
the analysis itself.  However, the volume and complexity of the mod-
eling techniques imply an equally complex array of simplifying as-
sumptions and potential shortcomings.  In general, the TMDL proc-
ess highlights data limitations and our ignorance of the physical,
chemical, and ecological factors that determine the fate of pollutants.
3.  How Is Responsibility for Reductions Determined?
Having determined the contribution of source categories to im-
pairment, the TMDL must assign load “allocations” (divisions of re-
sponsibility for reductions) that are expected to bring the waterbody
into compliance.81  In the case of some, though not necessarily all
sources, these allocations will require reductions in current dis-
charges.  Thus, the allocations determine responsibility for the tech-
nological or land management changes that will lead to improvements
in water quality.  For example, a currently discharging source, if allo-
cated a zero wasteload, must totally eliminate its discharges.
In some cases, the allocation is assigned to specific sources, in
others, to general categories such as a type of land use.  Not surpris-
ingly, allocations to specific sources tend be directed at point sources
and general allocations directed toward to nonpoint sources.  As in
the determination of sources, the allocation process often involves a
quantitative modeling exercise.  Modeling is used to estimate the im-
pact of a load reduction from a particular source on the receiving wa-
terbody.  Models may also be used to predict how changes in land use
due to economic growth will add to the waste load.82
Consider the allocations used to reduce Biochemical Oxygen
Demand (BOD) in the Slough.  Recall that the two primary sources
contributing to the oxygen deficit are Portland International Airport
and urban runoff.  Oregon allocated responsibility for reductions by
considering the relative baseline contributions to the oxygen deficit.
These relative contributions were determined, via modeling, to be 3.8
lbs. of BOD airport load for every pound of urban runoff load.  This
ratio provided the basis for the allocation of reductions.  Within these
broad categories further divisions were made.  For de-icing, eighty-
nine percent was assigned to the airport and the remaining eleven
percent to the Oregon National Guard.  For urban runoff, forty-six
81. See supra Part II.D.
82. If growth is expected, the TMDL must explicitly consider that as a source category and
provide an allocation for land use changes.
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percent was assigned to permitted stormwater dischargers and the
remainder to future growth and non-permitted sources.83 In the
course of the public comment process the allocation was explained as
follows: “DEQ . . . feels that allocations based on the relative contri-
butions of the pollutant is appropriate for a situation in which one
source causes most of the water quality impairment.”84  Note that the
rationale for the allocation makes no reference to the costs of dis-
charge controls.  Instead, equity seems the underlying motivation.  No
explicit rationale need be, or is, given.
Allocations are also motivated by pragmatism.  In several cases,
the permitted allocation is equal to the baseline contribution of a
source, implying no need for source reductions.  These examples in-
clude upstream sources of bacteria (which, because they are upstream
are not controllable via this particular TMDL)85 and atmospheric
deposition of lead (uncontrollable for similar reasons).86  Interest-
ingly, specific point sources are in some cases also exempt from load
reductions.  This is true presumably because point sources are already
subject to “best available” controls on releases.  For example, a land-
fill generating lead-contaminated leachate was not required to
achieve reductions in excess of its baseline allocation.87
Discharge reductions in Columbia Slough are to come from a va-
riety of sources.  For bacteria, reductions are achieved by eliminating
combined sewer overflow (CSO) discharges88 and eliminating illegal
raw sewage sources. Both received a load allocation of zero.89  The
primary reductions in lead loadings are allocated to sources of urban
runoff.  These reductions are to come from changes in industrial
stormwater permits and implementation of BMPs applied to com-
mercial, industrial, and traffic corridor land uses.90  For nutrients, re-
ductions from a single agricultural point source and drainage district
water flow management changes are required.  Direct reduction in
organic contaminants, such as DDT and dioxin are not possible since
the release of these pollutants is now prohibited.  Instead, the TMDL
83. See CSTMDL, supra note 62, at 12-14.
84. Id. at E-14.
85. See id. at 30.
86. See id. at 36.
87. See id. at 38.
88. See id. at 28.  The City has been ordered to eliminate all untreated CSO discharges to
the Columbia Slough.  See Amended and Stipulated Consent Order, WQ-NWR-91-75, cited in
CSTMDL, supra note 62 app. E at E-21.
89. See id. at 30.
90. BMPs are discussed in more detail in Part IV infra.
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focuses on erosion in the drainage area.  Stormwater transport of con-
taminated sediment is the primary transport and deposition mecha-
nism.  The stormwater allocation is reduced.  Moreover, of the total
organic allocation, thirty-three percent is devoted to future growth,
since construction promotes erosion and is expected to increase loads.
Reductions are to be achieved by implementation of erosion control
BMPs.
4.  How Will Implementation and Enforcement of the TMDL Be
Achieved?
With the allocation of loads, and the reductions in discharges
they imply, TMDLs must then specify the policies that will be used to
achieve those allocations.91  How are allocations to be monitored?
What enforcement tools can be brought to bear to ensure compli-
ance?  Is private or public funding available for the technological and
management changes implied by the allocations?  The more specific
and helpful a TMDL is in response to these questions, the more likely
are its load reductions to be translated from aspirations into reality.
The Columbia Slough TMDL is noteworthy in that it provides
particularly detailed descriptions of implementation activities.  Im-
plementation takes a variety of forms, including monitoring, revisions
to NPDES permits, public capital projects, and the use of BMPs.
Monitoring requirements include an ongoing study of airport-related
BOD, a survey of area septic systems to identify sources of bacteria,
and monitoring of toxic runoff associated with environmental cleanup
sites.  Revision of the airport’s NPDES permit is identified as a way
to promote more effective treatment of de-icing runoff. 92  Public capi-
tal projects that will lead to reductions include the construction of
sanitary sewers, removal of cesspools, construction of treatment facili-
ties for CSOs, and separation of sewers from stormwater systems.93
Both private landowners and local government entities are required
to use a variety of BMPs, including redesign of roof drains to avoid
bacteria discharges from septic systems, techniques to control erosion
91. See Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
64 Fed. Reg. at 46,033.  “The implementation plan must contain reasonable assurance that the
implementation activities will occur.”  See id.  “Without implementation, TMDLs are merely
paper plans to attain water quality standards.”  Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and
Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
65 Fed. Reg. at 43,625.
92. See CSTMDL, supra note 62, at 15.
93. See id. at 25.
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and the transport of contaminated sediment, and changes in flow
management by the area drainage district. 94  Renewal of stormwater
permits will also be contingent on evidence of BMP compliance.95
The plans are also explicit in their assignment of responsibility
for monitoring activities and BMP implementation among govern-
ment entities.  Memorandums of agreement between designated
management agencies form the basis for this division of authority.96
Responsibility is divided between the DEQ, a collection of municipal
governments, county government, and the state Departments of Ag-
riculture and Transportation.97  In addition, DEQ lists a set of possi-
ble funding sources for TMDL-related attainment projects, available
to both private and public entities.98
On paper, the Columbia Slough TMDL illustrates the promise of
an ambient water quality-driven regulatory approach.  The TMDL
identifies impairments and their sources, allocates responsibility for
source reductions and management improvements, and offers a de-
tailed plan for monitoring and implementing improvements.  This
marks an ambitious expansion of efforts relative to conventional wa-
ter quality regulation.  The TMDL expands waterbody and source
monitoring and the techniques used to analyze pollutant transport
and deposition.  The plan also imposes regulatory requirements on
previously unregulated sources and mandates changes in land and wa-
ter management practices throughout the drainage area.  Finally, the
TMDL notifies the source of those problems and identifies the pri-
vate and public parties responsible for improvements.
B.  Other Examples
One of the distinguishing features of Columbia Slough is that ag-
ricultural nonpoint sources are not a significant source of impairment.
As previously noted, agricultural nonpoint sources will be featured in
94. See id. at 25.
95. See id. at 16.  For more discussion of BMPs, see Part IV.B, infra.
96. See CSTMDL, supra note 62, at 3.
97. See id. at 45.
98. See id. app. E at E-3.  According to DEQ,  “several sources of funding are currently
available, either through federal programs administered by the Natural Resource Conservation
Service or a local soil and water conservation district (SWCD).  There are also state cost sharing
dollars which may be available through the SWCD or through a local watershed council.  The
state also has funding under the Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds that landowners, as-
sociations, or commodity groups can apply for directly.   Finally, Oregon is applying to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture for additional funding under the Conservation Reserve Enhance-
ment Program.” See id.
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many TMDLs, due to the prevalence of excessive nutrient loadings in
many of the nation’s waterways.  A brief description of nutrient
TMDLs is therefore instructive. Like the Columbia Slough analyses,
TMDLs for nutrients involve modeling exercises to determine source
contributions from agriculture, urban nonpoint sources, and point
sources — all of which can contribute to nitrogen and phosphorus
loads.
North Carolina’s plan for nitrogen reduction in the Neuse River
basin is illustrative.99  The TMDL estimates the relative contributions
of point and nonpoint sources and calls for thirty percent reductions
in nitrogen loads from both point and nonpoint sources.100  For agri-
cultural nonpoint sources, the TMDL proposes to achieve reductions
through farmer participation in local planning exercises or compli-
ance with BMPs (specifically, installation of forested riparian areas or
vegetative filter strips).  Other initiatives included in the TMDL are a
requirement that those applying fertilizer to areas of more than fifty
acres receive training in nutrient management.101
A characteristic of several nutrient TMDLs is that reductions are
sought from both point sources and from nonpoint sources.  Mary-
land requires NPDES permitting changes for sewage treatment in the
Port Tobacco watershed.102  California calls for revision of NPDES
permits to meet nutrient reductions in San Diego Creek and Newport
Bay.103  Delaware’s Nanticoke River TMDL requires nutrient removal
at three wastewater treatment plants,104  and Delaware’s Indian River
TMDL calls for the total elimination of point source discharges.105  In-
99. See NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF ENV’T AND NAT. RESOURCES, TOTAL MAXIMUM
DAILY LOAD FOR TOTAL NITROGEN TO THE NEUSE RIVER ESTUARY, NORTH CAROLINA
(1999) <http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/TMDL/Neuse_TMDL.PDF>,  [hereinafter Neuse River
TMDL].
100. See id. at 37, 38.
101. See id. at 39.
102. See MARYLAND DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF
NITROGEN AND PHOSPHORUS FOR THE PORT TOBACCO RIVER (1999) (visited October 12,
2000)  <http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/tmdl.htm> [hereinafter Port Tobacco TMDL].
103. See U.S. EPA REGION 9, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS FOR NUTRIENTS, SAN
DIEGO CREEK AND NEWPORT BAY, CALIFORNIA (visited October 12, 2000)  
<http://www.epa.gov/region09/water/tmdl/final.html> [hereinafter San Diego Creek TMDL].
104. See DELAWARE DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVTL. CONTROL, TOTAL
MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD ANALYSIS FOR NANTICOKE RIVER AND BROAD CREEK, DELAWARE
viii (1998) <http://www.dnrec.state.de.us/DNREC2000/Library/Misc/Unorg/nbrtmdla.pdf>
[hereinafter Nanticoke River TMDL].
105. See DELAWARE DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVTL. CONTROL, TOTAL
MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD ANALYSIS FOR INDIAN RIVER, INDIAN RIVER BAY, AND REHOBOTH
BAY, DELAWARE (1998), <http://www.dnrec.state.de.us/newpages/pdf/ibfinaltmdl.pdf> [herein-
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terestingly, several TMDLs are also counting on reductions in atmos-
pheric deposition due to more stringent CAA controls on emissions
of nitrogen oxides in order to meet nitrogen load reduction goals.106
In all of these cases, however, the net is also cast toward cur-
rently un-regulated sources, including agricultural nonpoint sources.
All of the aforementioned TMDLs set nonpoint allocations.  The San
Diego Creek TMDL proposes to extend discharge requirements to
small, unregulated nurseries.107  It also requires the development of
nutrient management plans for all agricultural operations not regu-
lated by waste discharge requirements.108  The Maryland Port To-
bacco TMDL’s nonpoint allocation assumes no additional require-
ments beyond existing BMP practices.109  It does suggest that existing
state programs will support the implementation of future nonpoint
source controls, however.110  Delaware’s Nanticoke River and Indian
River TMDLs require plans to institute agricultural BMPs in order to
achieve those TMDLs’ nonpoint allocations.111  And as noted above,
North Carolina’s Neuse River TMDL explicitly requires expanded
use of agricultural BMPs.112
The problems associated with translating nonpoint allocations
into concrete improvements are explored below.113  Completed
TMDLs do indicate that a set of previously unregulated, unmanaged
sources is experiencing, at the very least, heightened regulatory scru-
tiny.
IV.  LONG-RUN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM
Having described the scope and promise of the new TMDL rules,
we now turn to issues raised by the long-run implementation of the
program.  The federal government and states have broad, if some-
what untested, legal authority for expansion of controls to previously
unregulated sources.  After a description of their respective authority
we turn to an exploration of policy tools available to promote source
reductions and beneficial land and water management practices.
after Indian River TMDL].
106. See Neuse River TMDL, supra note 99, at 40.
107. See San Diego Creek TMDL, supra note 101, at 21.
108. See id.
109. See Port Tobacco TMDL, supra note 102, at 25.
110. See id.
111. See Nanticoke River TMDL, supra note 104, at 4-3 ; Indian River TMDL, supra note
105, at 3-10.
112. See Neuse River TMDL, supra note 99, at 9.
113. See infra Part IV.
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Then, we describe a set of scientific, legal, and practical challenges
that will be faced by states as they seek approval for and implementa-
tion of their TMDL programs.
A.  Federal Authority and Nonpoint Sources
The Clean Water Act prohibits discharge of a pollutant without a
permit.114  This broad prohibition is subject to a very important limita-
tion, however.  It applies in a legal sense only to discharges from
point sources.115  One way to expand federal legal authority is the se-
mantic strategy of simply relabeling nonpoint sources as point
sources.116  In fact, the EPA proposed (but withdrew) an expansion of
the definition of point sources to large-scale feeding operations and
certain aquaculture and silviculture practices as part of its 1999 pro-
posals.117  In some cases, even smaller agricultural operations may be
reclassified as sources subject to NPDES permitting, or threatened
with such reclassification as an incentive to improve management
practices.118  But despite efforts to expand the universe of sources
subject to the CWA’s permitting, there remains a large universe of
sources that resist simple reclassification.
As a result, the CWA’s powerful, permit-driven mode of regula-
tion does not apply to the primary cause of current water degrada-
tion.  Some federal leverage exists, but it is more indirect than that
provided for by the CWA’s point source provisions.  For example,
section 319 of the Act addresses waters impaired by nonpoint sources.
The section requires states to submit reports of such impairment,
identify broad categories of sources, and identify BMPs and other
measures to control “to the maximum extent practicable” pollution
from those sources.119  States are left with the discretion to determine
whether control efforts are to be regulatory or nonregulatory, com-
pelled or voluntary.  Nowhere in the section is an explicit enforce-
ment authority granted to the federal government.  In principle, the
federal government could withhold a state’s NPDES permitting
authority if the state fails to follow through on section 319’s require-
114. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
115. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994).
116. The authority to reclassify pollution sources under the CWA resides with the EPA.
This was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
117. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
118. See Dairy Farmer Required to Obtain NPDES Permit for Manure, U.S. WATER NEWS,
October 1999, at 15.  The case involved a small dairy operation with significant manure man-
agement problems.
119. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (1994).
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ments.120  But this extreme measure is not a substitute for a more ex-
plicit, practical federal ability to compel nonpoint reductions.121
More subtle forms of federal influence are available.  Appropria-
tions are available to states under section 319 and section 208. The
threat of funding withdrawals, while a relatively weak incentive given
the limited nature of funds at stake, is available to the EPA.122  Sec-
tion 208 instructs states, among other things, to develop a process to
identify agricultural and forestry nonpoint sources.  These sources in-
clude return flows from irrigated agriculture, runoff from manure dis-
posal areas, and land used for livestock and crop production.  The
section sets forth procedures and methods (including land use re-
quirements) to control such sources to the extent feasible 123 and pro-
vides revocable funding for the process.124  EPA efforts to motivate
state nonpoint initiatives are illustrated by an EPA memo to regional
administrators, calling on them to “focus substantial grant dollars . . .
toward those states that are providing reasonable assurances that
nonpoint source load allocations established in TMDLs will in fact be
achieved.”125  The memo also suggests that the administrators may
“deny or revoke a state’s enhanced benefits status under the new sec-
tion 319 nonpoint source guidance.”126  These types of funding incen-
tives indicate the EPA’s concern with state nonpoint program devel-
opment.  They also signal the lack of more substantive authority on
the part of the EPA to motivate that development.
Federal authority over the management of federal lands can be
used to promote nonpoint source improvements.  The Forest Service
and the Bureau of Land Management, in principle, can use their
authority to ensure adequate water monitoring and the implementa-
120. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2)-(3) (1994) (authorizing the withdrawal of NPDES permit-
ting authority from the delegated state).
121. For criticisms of section 319’s weakness see David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint
Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1996), and Houck, supra note 33, at 10,391.
122. The EPA received a $100 million increase in appropriations for fiscal year 1999 to deal
with nonpoint source problems and considered making awards contingent on state adoption of
improved nonpoint source initiatives.  See generally Susan Bruninga, EPA Eyes Change to
Funding Formula To Maintain Levels for Some States, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 1844
(1999).
123. Section 208 calls for the development of area-wide waste treatment plans by states.  See
33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (1998).
124. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(d) (1998).
125. MEMORANDUM FROM THE U.S. EPA OFFICE OF WATER ON NEW POLICIES FOR
ESTABLISHING AND IMPLEMENTING TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (last modified August 8,
1997) <http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/ratepace.html>.
126. See id.
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tion of BMPs for grazing, logging, and road construction activities.  In
fact, both agencies have mandates to manage public lands for multi-
ple uses, including recreation, fish and wildlife, and watershed uses.127
Also, section 401 of the CWA empowers the States to review facilities
or activities that require a federal permit.128  Thus, states can compel
federal agencies to manage lands in a manner compatible with water
quality maintenance and improvement.129
Finally, the Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve
and Wetland Reserve Programs in principle could be harnessed to
promote BMPs on agricultural land.  Access to agricultural price sup-
port and land retirement programs could be made conditional on the
adoption of pesticide and fertilizer reductions, though this is not cur-
rent practice.130
Regarding the TMDL program itself, it is clear that primary
authority for policies to implement TMDLs resides with the states.
States have primary responsibility for developing their own lists of
impaired waters and they are granted wide latitude to determine their
own priorities and implementation plans.131  However, recent litiga-
tion and the EPA’s own posture suggest that there must, and will, be
a strong federal oversight of these state programs.132  The proposed
rules outline the agency’s vision of its own authority.  According to
the rules, “EPA has strong and diverse authorities to implement con-
trols over nonpoint sources in the event that EPA were to disapprove
a TMDL submitted by a State and to develop a TMDL for the im-
paired water.”133  This assertion sounds somewhat defensive, and
should, since as previously argued federal authority to compel non-
point controls is limited.  However, the rule identifies section 504 as
one particular source of federal authority.  Under section 504, the
administrator can compel action when there is an “imminent or sub-
127. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-529 (1994); 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
128. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1998).
129. See Debra Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 251 (1996).
130. Acceptance into the Conservation Reserve Program is currently sensitive to some envi-
ronmental considerations, including proximity to waterbodies.  For an analysis of the benefits of
this kind of environmental targeting, see PETER FEATHER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AG.,  AER-
778, ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND THE TARGETING OF
CONSERVATION PROGRAMS (1999).
131. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (1998);  40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b) (1999).
132. See section II.C supra, for a description of this litigation.  Also, see discussion of Pron-
solino v. Marcus, supra note 43.
133. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. at 46,034.
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stantial endangerment to health or welfare of persons.”134  As an ex-
ample of such an endangerment, the rule suggests a community’s in-
ability to market contaminated shellfish.
But in general, the federal TMDL program is not self-
implementing. As the proposed rule acknowledges, load allocations
for nonpoint sources are not directly enforceable under the CWA.
“With respect to nonpoint sources the load allocations in a TMDL
are only ‘enforceable’ to the extend they are made so by state laws
and regulations.”135  Despite the federal government’s clear role in
prompting and overseeing state action under section 303, state law
will ultimately determine the effectiveness of the TMDL program’s
long-run implementation.
B.  State Authority and Nonpoint Sources
The litmus test of the TMDL program’s success will be its ability
to promote more effective nonpoint controls at the state level.136
Nonpoint sources will increasingly occupy the attention of States as
they identify impairments and sources and develop plans for water
quality improvement.137  But as argued above, nonpoint sources his-
torically have not been the prime target of regulation.  Moreover,
there is likely to be political pressure at the state level to avoid an ex-
pansion of controls to this category of sources. To date, state initia-
tives have relied heavily on voluntary, unenforceable measures, par-
ticularly with regard to agricultural runoff.138  Taken together, these
factors raise concern regarding the states’ willingness to meaningfully
compel reductions in nonpoint loads. The EPA’s proposed TMDL
rule anticipates this concern by requiring “reasonable assurance” of
implementation.  These reasonable assurances require states to spec-
134. See 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (2000).
135. See Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
64 Fed. Reg. at 46,042.
136. There is some skepticism regarding the federal government’s ability to force improve-
ments in nonpoint policy.  In the words of an official at the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, “there
is nothing in [the new rules] that addresses the issue of ensuring that the reductions that are
supposed to be achieved from nonpoint sources are real, and measurable, and enforceable.”
BAY JOURNAL, Oct. 1999 at 10.
137. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
138. According to a detailed survey of State nonpoint pollution enforcement mechanisms,
“[a]griculture is the most problematic area for enforceable mechanisms.  Where state laws exist,
they often defer to incentives, cost-sharing, and voluntary programs.”  ENVTL. LAW INST.,
ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS FOR THE CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER
POLLUTION (1997) iii.
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ify implementation policies, the timing of controls or incentives,
analysis of the likely effectiveness of policies, and funding sources.139
For point sources, consistency with NPDES permits is considered
a valid “assurance” of implementation.  For nonpoint sources, the
most direct assurance of implementation is the availability of state
laws to compel nonpoint controls, and the willingness to enforce
those laws.  There are in fact a large number of state statutory provi-
sions that could be called into service.  These laws include general
prohibitions against pollution discharges, enforcement actions trig-
gered by fish kills or threats to public health, sedimentation and ero-
sion laws, and laws designed to protect specific areas for conserva-
tion.140  Most states have access to such statutory levers, which can be
directly cited as a form of reasonable assurance.  In addition, regula-
tions governing stormwater runoff, zoning, and other land use ordi-
nances would likely qualify.  Assurance could also be demonstrated
by management contracts between government agencies and land us-
ers, memoranda of understanding between government entities, and
bonding requirements to ensure appropriate land management prac-
tices.  A variety of approaches will arise as state regulators seek inno-
vative ways to motivate quality improvements.  As an example, there
are proposals in Washington State to limit irrigation water allocations
to farmers who fail to take precautions against sediment runoff.141 In
Iowa, a pilot crop yield insurance plan reduces the risk to farmers of
under-performing crop yields when they decrease fertilizer applica-
tions.142  These examples are indicative of the kind of policy innova-
139. This includes analysis of the “anticipated or past effectiveness of the best management
practices and/or controls that are expected to meet the wasteload and load allocations.”  Pro-
posed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. at
46,033.  For a detailed definition of what constitutes “reasonable assurance” see Revisions to
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollut-
ant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Plan-
ning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,598-600.
140. See ENVTL. LAW INST., ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAWS TO CONTROL
NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1998).  According to the study, which reviews appli-
cable laws in all 50 States, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, “most states have a num-
ber of enforceable authorities that can be used to address various nonpoint source discharges.”
ELI’s earlier study also showed, however, that many of these legal mechanisms contain exemp-
tions and may not always be effectively enforced.  ENVTL. LAW INST, supra note 138, at i-v.
141. See Irrigators Warned to Clean Farm Runoff to Protect Fish Habitat, U.S. WATER
NEWS, March 1998, at 14.
142. See Crop Insurance Plan Helps Farmers Reduce Nitrogen Use, U.S. WATER NEWS,
March 1999, at 1.  Over-fertilization is common since it builds in a margin of safety (for the
farmer) against fertilizer losses due to heavy rain-related runoff.
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tions that can be harnessed by states to compel or otherwise promote
nonpoint load reductions.
On one hand, the long list of existing state enforcement tools is
reassuring.  On the other hand, that long list has thus far failed to
yield adequate water quality in many of the nation’s streams, lakes,
and estuaries.  In some cases, the failure is due to explicit exemptions
for certain nonpoint sources.  In other cases, the law may simply be
unenforced.  Many of the states with general discharge provisions ex-
plicitly exempt agriculture.143  Massachusetts prohibits the discharge
of any pollutant without a permit, but agricultural nonpoint dis-
charges are exempted.144  Exemptions are also found in more targeted
regulations.  In Ohio, land development that disturbs the soil cannot
occur without state approval.145  But, this requirement does not extend
to agricultural operations.  The TMDL-driven need for load reduc-
tions may erode some of these statutory exemptions as point sources
permitees exert political pressure of their own to avoid further, costly
point source reductions, and environmental interests focus greater at-
tention on impairments.146  Dormant provisions may also be called
into more active service by state program administrators who must ul-
timately demonstrate real pollution reductions under section 303.
C.  Best Management Practices as Enforceable Standards
Best Management Practices are a central feature of most non-
point source control programs.  BMPs are management standards
that guide forest, agriculture, construction, and other activities in or-
der to reduce nonpoint runoff.  BMPs are based on the practical ex-
perience of land managers and improvements in the scientific and
technical understanding of the relationship between land manage-
ment practices and environmental impacts.  In agriculture, examples
include the installation of buffer strips along stream beds, adequate
fencing to keep livestock from directly soiling surface water, placing
sheds over manure piles to minimize runoff, and low chemical inten-
sity pest control techniques.  Forestry BMPs include harvest and road
143. See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 138, at 11.
144. See MASS. REGS. CODE. tit. 314, § 3.05 (2000).
145. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1511.02(E) (1998).
146. The State of Maryland recently imposed new rules on the ability of poultry slaughter-
houses to spread sludge on fields beyond the fields’ capacity to absorb it.  The rules will be
added as a condition of state permits governing slaughterhouse operations.  See Peter S. Good-
man, Md. Poultry Firms to Face Strict Rules on Sludge Use, WASH POST, March 30, 1999, at A6.
The rules call for fines of up to $10,000 a day if slaughterhouse is found to be noncompliant.  See
id.
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construction planning to avoid soil erosion from trails, roads, and
stream crossings.  Construction BMPs have a similar focus on tech-
niques to minimize sedimentation due to erosion caused by soil dis-
turbance.  BMPs for municipalities include procedures to minimize
the impact of road salting on urban runoff.
Depending on their application, BMPs can represent informal
rules of thumb or be subject to approval by a government entity, such
as a conservation district, state, or the U.S. Forest Service.  As an il-
lustration, Florida employs BMPs approved by a variety of organiza-
tions, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture Natural Re-
sources Conservation Service and the Florida Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDAC).  FDAC has issued spe-
cific conservation practices for the purpose of protecting Florida’s wa-
ter resources (including streams, lakes and wetlands) from pollution
associated with forestry operations.147  These BMPs were originally
designed in the mid-1970s in response to the CWA, but were revised
in 1993 with the assistance of representatives from state and federal
government, universities, the forest industry, and environmental
groups.  The recommended practices are detailed and depend on the
size and type of waterbody involved, the local soil type, and the gen-
eral potential of the site for erosion and sedimentation.  A BMP
Technical Advisory Committee meets biennially to evaluate the
status and progress of BMP implementation and effectiveness.148
Section 208 of the CWA, which mandates state water quality
plans, calls on states to describe in its plans the BMPS “which the
[state] agency has selected as the means to control nonpoint source
pollution where necessary to protect or achieve approved water
uses.” 149  The section outlines the desired characteristics of BMPs for
a variety of nonpoint source categories.150
BMPs represent the nonpoint analog to end-of-pipe controls on
point sources.  They identify the technologies and techniques that
147. See generally  FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. AND CONSUMER SERVICES, SILVICULTURE BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1993).
148. The Bureau of Water Analysis of the Florida Department of Environmental Regula-
tion issued BMPs for Agriculture in 1978 pursuant to statutory requirements of the Clean Water
Act.  See NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT SECTION, FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. REGULATION,
A MANUAL OF REFERENCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES
(1978).  Unlike the specific conservation practices for forestry operations, these BMPs are gen-
eral practices or categories of practices required to achieve the abatement of nonpoint source
pollution.  The manual refers to the U.S. Department of Agriculture for specific BMPs that are
applicable in Florida.
149. Supra note 123, and associated text.
150. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.6(c)(4)(iii)(A)-(G) (1998).
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lead to pollutant reductions.  In some cases, states use BMPs as an
aspirational goal or background threat, rather than as an enforceable
standard.  Colorado law calls for the development and approval of
BMPs by the state department of agriculture, but defines BMPs as
“any voluntary activity, procedure, or practice.”151  Thus, BMPs are
not directly enforceable.  Colorado does encourage their use to avoid
the possibility of future regulation if “continued monitoring reveals
that rules and regulations . . . are not preventing or mitigating the
presence of the subject agricultural chemical to the extent neces-
sary.”152  But, reliance on voluntary efforts should be viewed with
skepticism.153
In other cases, BMPs are directly enforceable.  Oregon law re-
quires the State Forestry Board to develop and require the use of
BMPs “as necessary to insure that to the maximum extent practicable
nonpoint source discharges of pollutants resulting from forest opera-
tions on forestlands do not impair the achievement and maintenance
of water quality standards . . . for the waters of the state,” and crimi-
nal and civil penalties can be levied for failure to use these BMPs.154
This regulatory “stick” is complemented by a significant “carrot,”
however.  Forest operations conducted in accordance with BMPs can
use such management as a defense against claims of water quality
standard violations.155  In Maryland, agricultural operations must em-
ploy BMPs under soil conservation district plans to protect nontidal
wetlands.156 Similar requirements are imposed on agriculture in  the
Chesapeake Bay watershed.157  Federal law can compel the implemen-
tation of BMPs, particularly on federal lands.158  In addition, states can
independently force the federal government to make its financial as-
151. COLO. REV. STAT. §25-8-103(1.3) (1999).
152. COLO. REV. STAT. §25-8-205.5(6)-(7) (1999).  According to a state soil conservation
district BMP guide for farmers, “if the voluntary approach is successful, further mandatory con-
trols . . .will not need to be implemented.”  SHAVANO SOIL CONSERVATION DISTRICT, BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR AGRICULTURE IN THE UNCOMPAHGRE VALLEY 7 (1997).
153. A study of barriers to BMP adoption found, not surprisingly, that the barriers were
largely economic.  “Many landowners noted the environmental benefits of the selected BMPs,
but were reluctant to adopt them due to the direct costs involved.”  Eric Palas & Jeff Tisl, The
Implementation of Innovative Best Management Practices in the Sny Magill Watershed (visited
October 12, 2000) <http://www.igsb.uiowa.edu/inforsch/sny/implemen.htm>.
154. OR. REV. STAT. § 527.765(1) (1997).
155. See OR. REV. STAT. § 527.765(3) (1997).
156. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 8-1205 (1998).
157. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 8-1808(c)(6) (1998).
158. See Richard Whitman, Clean Water or Multiple Use? Best Management Practices For
Water Quality Control in the National Forests, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 909 (1989).
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sistance programs, permits, licenses, and development projects con-
form with state nonpoint control programs, which may feature
BMPs.159
Recent cases illustrate a growing judicial awareness of the impor-
tance of BMPs.  In Sierra Club v. Martin,160 the U.S. Forest Service’s
adherence to BMPs was at issue.  In Blue Mountains Biodiversity
Project v. Blackwood,161 BMPs associated with a site assessment were
found to be inadequate given the characteristics of the site.  Idaho
Sporting Congress v. Jemmet,162 tested the compliance of a National
Forest timber sale contract with applicable BMPs.  These cases sug-
gest that BMPs increasingly can, and will, be examined to determine
compliance with statutory land management requirements.
D.  The Technical Basis for Listing Criteria and Load Modeling
The TMDL program requires states to develop scientifically and
legally defensible data collection procedures, listing criteria, and wa-
tershed modeling tools.163  TMDLs may be challenged if the imple-
menting state agency fails to adequately define and employ these
technical duties.  In terms of listing waters as impaired, the proposed
rule requires states to include with their section 303(d) lists a descrip-
tion of the methodology and factors used to prioritize and list waters
as impaired.164  As an example, the methodology description can ex-
plain how the number and severity of “exceedences” of a numeric
chemical criteria translate into an impairment.  Similar requirements
are applied to TMDL load reduction plans.  Implementation plans
are required to contain monitoring and modeling procedures that will
be used to gauge the effectiveness of load reduction actions.  States
are also required to explain their approach to “assessing the effec-
tiveness of best management practices and control actions for non-
159. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (b)(2)(F) (1999).  See also supra note 129, and associated text.
160. See 992 F.Supp. 1448 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that the Forest Service had not failed to
implement BMPs as required by federal law).
161. See 161 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding the BMPs employed in an environ-
mental assessment were inappropriate since the area had suffered fire burn and increased levels
of erosion).
162. See 1997 WL 855506 (D. Idaho 1997) (determining that road construction in a Nez
Perce National Forest timber sale had complied with all relevant BMPs).
163. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions
to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,602-10.
164. See Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
64 Fed. Reg. at 46,019.
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point sources.”165  These requirements may slow the process of TMDL
implementation since they require the adoption of what may, for
some states, be new techniques.  Pollutant sources, dissatisfied with
their designation, may also seek relief from TMDL load reductions by
challenging a state’s modeling tools, water quality criteria, and data
collection procedures.166
Recent litigation has focused on one state agency’s inability to
promulgate lawful section 303(d) listing criteria and TMDLs associ-
ated with nutrient water quality standards.167  In the case, the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control’s
(DHEC) listing standards and associated TMDLs were voided by an
administrative law judge.  The agency was found to have violated
proper public notice and other procedural safeguards designed to
subject its standards and models to technical and legal scrutiny.  Ac-
cording to the court, “DHEC has pursued its mission with unpromul-
gated regulations that should have been, but were not, subject to the
scrutiny of DHEC’s Board, the South Carolina General Assembly,
and the public.”168
While federal water quality standards are available, they are
published by the EPA only as non-regulatory guidance.169  The prom-
ulgation  of water quality standards lies squarely within the jurisdic-
165. Id. at 46,035.
166. The Indian River TMDL process is illustrative.  See Indian River TMDL, supra note
105.  Comments by a group representing agricultural interests called for peer review of data and
modeling procedures “by a wide range of experts in the field of science” before the TMDL was
implemented.  The implementing agency’s response pointed to use of a “state of the art” mod-
eling tool developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and extensive peer review of data
and technical assumptions by several interagency workgroups and technical advisory commit-
tees.  Response to Public Comments, Indian River TMDL (visited October 10, 2000)
<http://www.dnrec.state.de.us/>.
167. See Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health and
Envtl. Control, No. 98-ALJ-07-0267-CC & 98-ALJ-07-0585-CC, 1999 WL 1016064
(S.C.Admin.Law.Judge.Div.) *1, 2 (consolidating two previous cases and concluding that “[a]t a
fundamental level these contested cases are about relationships.  The first is the relationship in
science that links phosphorus, an essential nutrient in the aquatic food chain, to the production
of the second link in that food chain, algae.  The second relationship is between law and sci-
ence.”).
168. Id.
169. See U.S. EPA, EPA-440/5-86-001, EPA’S QUALITY CRITERIA FOR WATER 1986 (1986).
The proposed TMDL rule points to federal Safe Drinking Water Act standards (which are con-
trolling for drinking water) as a possible reference point for states against which they “can com-
pare water quality monitoring data, or . . . use to add or revise water quality criteria to support
public water supply use, in the absence of more stringent criteria that support more sensitive
ecological uses.”  Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regula-
tion, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,017.
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tion of state law.  Moreover, the CWA requires that criteria adopted
by states must be consistent with their own laws governing how regu-
lations become law.170  DHEC’s failure was in inadequately translating
narrative state water quality criteria into numeric standards for phos-
phorus, inorganic nitrogen, and chlorophyll a.  Narrative standards
are common in state statutes and, as the term suggests, are general,
verbal descriptions of required water quality.  In South Carolina, one
such narrative standard reads that waters shall be free from “waste in
concentrations or combinations which interfere with classified water
uses. . ., existing water uses, or which are harmful to human, animal,
plant, or aquatic life.”171  The court explained that the state must “for
both practical and regulatory reasons, ‘translate’ its narrative water
quality criteria into numerical values when making Section 303(d)
listing determinations.”172  The court’s ruling found that the state
failed to make this translation in a way that satisfied procedural re-
quirements.  The standards being used by DHEC failed to have “clear
bounds and a rational basis for their implementation.”173  The agency
cannot relist the waters under section 303(d) until the U.S. EPA ap-
proves the “translation procedure” for converting South Carolina’s
narrative criteria into numeric criteria.
Perhaps more significantly, the judge’s ruling also requires the
agency to conduct a case-specific assessment of the waterbodies and
sources in question.  Assessment of the waterbodies is essentially a
data collection and evaluation exercise.  The analysis of sources is
typically more complicated.  Specifically, the agency must conduct an
evaluation “of the point and nonpoint source nutrient loadings, of
other possible causes or contributors to water quality impairment,
and of whether Section 303(d) listing can be avoided by DHEC’s full
implementation of existing point and nonpoint source controls, in-
cluding full implementation of BMPs at nonpoint sources.”174  This
kind of exercise is fraught with technical difficulties.  Analysis of
loadings and the effect of load reductions requires a watershed model
that captures transport process (such as infiltration and runoff),
ground water and surface water interactions, pollutant accumulation
and decay, and instream mixing.  In the case of nonpoint source loads,
170. See 40 C.F.R. § 25.10(b) (1998).
171. 61 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 68(E)(4)(d).
172. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health and
Envtl. Control, supra note 167 at *35.
173. Id. at *36.
174. Id. at *40.
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the science is relatively undeveloped due to the complexity of inter-
acting systems involved.175  Knowledge of the relationship between
control practices and loadings is particularly poor.  According to an
EPA supporting document for TMDL development, a key challenge
facing agencies is “the lack of highly developed, scientifically sound
approaches to identify problems in watersheds and to predict the re-
sults of potential control actions on water quality.  While a wide vari-
ety of models are available, each come with limitations on its use, ap-
plicability, and predictive capabilities.”176
Consider one particular, and relatively narrow technical issue:
the interaction between ground water and surface water quality.  The
“flows” of groundwater into surface water (or vice versa) are them-
selves highly uncertain and may occur over a period of decades.  This
makes cause and effect determinations nearly impossible.  The long
time lag also limits the ability of researchers to measure the effect of
control actions on receiving water quality.  Moreover, the conditions
under which surface and ground water interact have a crucial effect
on water chemistry (acidity, oxygen content, temperature) and bio-
logical conditions that ultimately affect water quality.177  Unfortu-
nately, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, “research on the in-
terface between groundwater and surface water has increased in
recent years but only a few stream environments have been studied,
and the transferrability of the research results is limited and uncer-
tain.”178
A lack of scientific certainty will in and of itself not legally hob-
ble TMDL plans, since certainty is not a prerequisite for program im-
plementation.179  Uncertainty does place a premium, however, on ad-
ministrative procedures that provide the greatest possible level of
scientific credibility to standards, models, and data collection.  Ac-
cordingly, the technical details of state TMDL programs will need to
engage in ongoing notice and comment procedures and evaluation by
175. See generally David Zaring, Federal Legislative Solutions to Agricultural Nonpoint
Source Pollution,  26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,128 (1996) (discussing problems associ-
ated with tying specific nonpoint practices with specific waterbody impairments).
176. U.S. EPA, EPA 841-R-94-002, COMPENDIUM OF WATERSHED-SCALE MODELS FOR
TMDL DEVELOPMENT 4 (1992).
177. See generally U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS Circular 1139, GROUND WATER AND
SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE (1998).
178. Id. at 77.
179. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1999).  In fact, section 303(d) explicitly requires TMDLs
to seek load reductions with a margin of safety that takes into account lack of knowledge con-
cerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water quality.  See id.
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expert panels.  This is likely to be a source of both significant upfront
and long-run program costs.
E.  Jurisdictional Conflicts
Section 303 provides a great deal of state discretion to determine
standards and implementation strategies.  This latitude, together with
the lack of correspondence between state boundaries and watershed
boundaries, raises the possibility of jurisdictional conflict over
TMDLs.  Most obviously, downstream water segments may inherit
water quality problems from upstream sources in other states.  Stan-
dards differ across states, sometimes to a significant degree.180  Less
stringent water quality standards and less effective implementation
upstream can alone create impairments in a downstream state with
stricter quality standards.  For this reason, the proposed rules require
states to identify a process for resolving disagreements with other ju-
risdictions.181  The rules also state that the EPA may establish TMDLs
“when interstate or international issues and coordination needs re-
quire EPA to assume a leadership role.”182 This will be particularly
true in the case of large rivers or boundary waters.  The agency also
sees a role for itself in determining “equitable upstream / downstream
allocations . . . that account for loadings to downstream waterbodies
like the Chesapeake Bay from far away upstream sources.”183
The need for a federal coordinating presence is likely to be par-
ticularly acute when conflicts arise due to atmospheric deposition.
Atmospheric deposition occurs when airborne pollution is deposited
directly onto the surface of the waterbody, or indirectly onto land and
waters within the watershed.  Because atmospheric deposition is a
major source of water impairment, section 303(d) inextricably links
state compliance with controls mandated by the Clean Air Act.  Ac-
cording to the EPA, eighty percent of the Delaware Bay’s mercury
load, forty-six percent of Tampa Bay’s cadmium load, and twenty-
seven percent of the Chesapeake Bay’s nitrogen load are due to air-
borne sources.184  The significance of these atmospheric loadings is
180. See Oliver Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Substances Under the Clean Water Act, 21
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,528 (1991) (showing that permitted concentrations of certain
chemicals may be 10,000 times more protective in some states than in others).
181. See Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
64 Fed. Reg. at 46,019.
182. Id. at 46,037.
183. Id.
184. See U.S. EPA,  EPA-453/R-97-011, DEPOSITION OF AIR POLLUTANTS TO THE GREAT
WATERS: SECOND REPORT TO CONGRESS 179-181 (1997) (noting that atmospheric nitrogen
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that they implicate sources over a huge geographic area.  Deposition
in the Chesapeake Bay is a particularly pertinent example.  Studies
based on data from the National Acid Deposition Assessment Pro-
gram suggest that only twenty-five percent of air deposition in the
Chesapeake watershed originates from sources within the watershed
(which contains areas in six states).185  The Chesapeake NOx “air-
shed” which defines the geographic range of airborne nitrogen
sources to the Bay, covers areas in thirteen states plus the District of
Columbia.  Given the significance of air deposition in that watershed,
and the broad geographic range of sources, there is the distinct possi-
bility of jurisdictional conflict that necessitates federal intervention.
F.  TMDLs and Water Quantity Law
As they move toward implementation, TMDL rules will in-
creasingly highlight the artificial distinction between water quality
and quantity issues, particularly in the West.  Water quantity deci-
sions, which are controlled primarily by state law, often have a direct
impact on water quality.  For instance, changes in stream flow affect
the transport of pollutants through a waterbody.  Also, the amount of
water taken or returned to a waterbody may significantly affect the
dilution of pollutants in that system.  Finally, water supply often de-
termines the suitability of a waterbody as habitat for fish or other
species.  In fact, reduced stream flows can constitute “water pollu-
tion” under the CWA.186  At a practical level, TMDLs will often have
to account for seasonal changes in flow in order to set appropriate
loadings consistent with states’ water quality standards.187  Because of
these interactions, water quantity decisions – relating to irrigation,
damming, reservoir management, basin-to-basin trades, etc. – may re-
loadings to coastal estuaries other than the Chesapeake range from twelve to forty-four percent
of the total).
185. See Karl Blakenship, Chesapeake Bay Watershed and NOx Airshed, ALLIANCE FOR
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY J., Sept. 1997, at 7.
186. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S.
700, 721 (1994) (limiting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s authority to supplant
state water quality standards in dam licensing proceedings).
187. See Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
64 Fed. Reg. at 46,016 (stating that “[changes in flow] may require that, for some pollutants, dif-
ferent TMDLs are established for different levels of instream flow, based on variations in flow
over the course of the year”).  See also Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Manage-
ment Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Pro-
gram in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65
Fed. Reg. at 43,624 (discussing the relationship of flow levels to seasonal variation) (stating
“EPA believes that TMDLs must be established so that water quality standards are attained and
maintained in all seasons and all flows.”).
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sult in changes in the waters’ section 303(d) status.  Correspondingly,
TMDLs will in some cases constrain water transfers involving im-
paired waterbodies.
As argued above, a wide variety of unresolved legal issues impact
the implementation of the TMDL program.  The interrelationship be-
tween water quantity decisions and water quality conditions will pres-
ent particularly challenging issues.  Water quantity law has a well-
deserved reputation for complexity.  Water rights have both public
and private characteristics, water law is largely state-determined, dif-
ferent laws govern groundwater and surface water (even though they
are physically interdependent), and entirely different systems for es-
tablishing rights are used in different regions of the country.188  In
terms of interjurisdictional conflict, states have a long history of con-
flict over water quantity apportionment.189  This type of conflict will
likely increase under the TMDL program as water quality impair-
ments become binding enforcement problems.
One consequence of quality concerns may be an increasing reli-
ance on water quantity acquisitions to preserve stream flows, an ap-
proach endorsed by the TMDL federal advisory committee.190  Fed-
eral acquisitions have already occurred due to concerns over species
habitat.191  Many states already have in place the legal foundations
necessary to allow purchase and trade of water rights to preserve in-
stream flow.192
188. Generally speaking, Eastern states rely on a “riparian” foundation for water rights,
while a “prior appropriation” system is used in the West.  See JOSEPH SAX & ROBERT ABRAMS,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS xvii (1986) (noting that
“[w]ater law is different, and in that difference lies the charm, the interest, the fascination and
the complexity of water law . . .”).  Id.  See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1998) (specifically preserv-
ing state jurisdiction over water quantity allocations).
189. See generally Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987); Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S.
673 (1995).  To avoid conflict, there are several interstate river compacts, one example of which
is the Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949); 1949 COLO. SESS. LAWS 485 §1,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-69-101(West 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §82a-520 (1999).  A similar
compact is currently being negotiated by Alabama, Georgia, and Florida over the waters in the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa basins.  See Southern Envtl.
Law Center, Interstate Water Wars (visited October 19, 2000) <http://www.selcnc.org/originals/
water_wars/water_wars.html>.
190. See FAC, supra note 4, at 51.
191. See generally Benjamin Simon, Federal Acquisitions of Water Through Voluntary
Transactions for Environmental Purposes, 16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 422 (1998) (describing
federal acquisitions in the Snake and Yakima basins, California’s Central Valley, and the
Truckee-Carson basin in Nevada).
192. See generally INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (Lawrence MacDonnell et
al. eds., 1989); SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH WATER MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
(Political Economy Research Center 1998) (describing state laws to allow for instream flow
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G.  The Location of Sources
TMDLs will raise the costs of, and in extreme cases create a pro-
hibition against, source development in watersheds suffering from
impairment.  New source restrictions, or any other policy creating
barriers to new sources, is a necessary element of any policy geared
toward water quality improvements.193  However, an unintended con-
sequence of TMDLs is that they may encourage the migration of
point and nonpoint sources to areas that are not currently associated
with water impairment.  In fact, the more successful policies are in
limiting loadings in impaired areas, the greater will be the incentive of
dischargers to relocate to areas where TMDL-driven restrictions are
not as binding or where control costs are not as high.194
V.  ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND POLLUTANT TRADING
A distinctive feature of the EPA’s approach to TMDL rules, and
its watershed policy more generally, is an emphasis on trading to
achieve “common-sense, cost-effective solutions for water quality
problems.”195  In principle, trading is highly desirable.  Trading allows
sources with responsibility for discharge reductions the flexibility to
determine where those reductions will occur.  The financial incentives
built into a trading scheme lead naturally to a situation in which the
costs of pollution control are minimized.196  Pollution permit markets,
in a decentralized manner, assign control activities to the parties
whose control costs are least.  This is economically efficient.  It is also
politically attractive, since it minimizes compliance costs for a given
pollutant reduction goal.  In terms of water quality regulation, trad-
ing’s desirability arises due to a vast disparity in pollutant control
costs across sources.  This is particularly true when nonpoint sources
markets and transfers).
193. See 40 C.F.R.§ 122.4(I) (1999).  There is already a new source restriction under the
CWA.  (“No new permit may be issued to a new source or a new discharger, if the discharge
from its construction or operation will cause or contribute to the violation of water quality stan-
dards”).  See id.
194. Members of the TMDL federal advisory committee expressed this concern with regard
to the point source offset proposal (which was dropped from the final rule).  “Some committee
members are concerned that enforcing the discharge restriction may in fact encourage develop-
ment to spread to less-polluted areas with fewer restrictions on land or water use.”  FAC, supra
note 4, at 17.
195. U.S. EPA, EPA 800-R-96-001, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED
TRADING ix (1996) [hereafter Watershed Framework].
196. See generally J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); T.H.
TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING (1985).
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are considered.197  Nonpoint source BMPs are thought to be a par-
ticularly cost-effective means to achieve water quality improve-
ments.198  For example, if point sources with high control costs can
purchase cheaper controls from nonpoint sources, the control cost
savings may be significant.
A wide variety of trading possibilities is contemplated by the
EPA.  A justification for the proposed new source offset rule was that
“EPA believes this proposed requirement will serve as a catalyst for
the establishment of a trading market between large new dischargers
and existing dischargers undergoing a significant expansion, and ex-
isting point source dischargers or nonpoint sources.”199  Point-point,
point-nonpoint, and nonpoint-nonpoint trades are all envisioned.200
The cost savings and flexibility provided by trading are the principal
motivations.201  Potential savings from point-point trading alone are
estimated to be as high as $1.9 billion per year.202
The theoretical desirability of pollution trading is accompanied
by a host of sobering practical challenges, however,203 and the history
of actual point-point trading to date under the CWA is very limited.
More limited still is persuasive evidence that trading implementation
can result in significant cost savings.
197. See Lyon & Farrow, supra note 9, at 219.  They find that the net benefits of nonpoint
controls, while negative, are significantly larger than a variety of point source controls.  Analysis
of the possible cost savings from one particular trading program found a $70 million cost of
point source-only controls, but an $11 million cost if reductions were achieved from nonpoint
controls.  See John Hall & C.M. Howett, Trading in the Tar-Pamlico, WATER ENV’T & TECH 58
(1994).
198. See Kurt Stephenson et al., Watershed-Based Effluent Trading: The Nonpoint Source
Challenge, 16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 412, 413 (1998).
199. Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and Fed-
eral Antidegradation Policy In Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Man-
agement Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,058.
200. See Watershed Framework, supra note 195, at xi-xiv.
201. The EPA’s proposed rule is designed to “provide for tradeoffs between alternative
point and nonpoint source control options so that cost effectiveness, technical effectiveness, and
the social and economic benefits of different allocations can be considered by decision-makers.”
Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg.
at 46,030.  (As noted earlier, however, the offset proposal was withdrawn in the final rule.  See
supra note 60).
202. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA,  EPA 800-R-002, PRESIDENT CLINTON’S CLEAN
WATER INITIATIVE: ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS 16 (1994).
203. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for
Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989); James T. B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, In-
stitutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE  J. REG.
369 (1989).
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A.  Trading under the Clean Water Act
The history of water quality trading can be summarized relatively
briefly.  A recent summary of trading and offset programs lists thirty-
seven such programs at various stages of development, the majority
of which (twenty-six) have not actually resulted in trades.204  Notable
trading experiments include the now-defunct Fox River BOD trading
program in Wisconsin.  Preliminary estimates of the savings from this
point-point trading program were $7 million a year for the partici-
pating firms.205 Unfortunately, and in stark contrast to the prediction
of cost savings, the program only produced a single trade.  In Colo-
rado, the Dillon Reservoir trading system allows trade between point
sources and nonpoint sources to reduce phosphorus loadings in the
reservoir.  Point-nonpoint trading activity has not actually material-
ized.  However, two trades between nonpoint sources have occurred
as nonpoint sources have become the primary remaining source of
discharges.206  The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency has approved
a single trade which substitutes nonpoint phosphorus source reduc-
tions for a point source reduction on the Minnesota River.207  In North
Carolina, the Tar-Pamlico plan calls for point source nutrient reduc-
tions.  Point sources must meet a cap on discharges or make a manda-
tory financial contribution to a nonpoint source reduction fund used
to implement agricultural BMPs.  To date, the point sources have met
the annually decreasing cap, primarily through improvements to
treatment facilities.208  These and other trading programs indicate
state and EPA willingness to experiment with the trading approach.
However, they are not particularly inspiring examples of trading’s
ability to achieve significant cost reductions, or enthusiasm from the
regulated community.  What is remarkable is how little actual trading
has arisen from these programs.
204. See generally 61 Fed. Reg. 4994 (1999); ENVIRONOMICS, A SUMMARY OF U.S.
EFFLUENT TRADING AND OFFSET PROJECTS (1996) (draft consultant report on file with
author).
205. See WILLIAM B. O’NEILL, The Regulation of Water Pollution Permit Trading under
Conditions of Varying Streamflow and Temperature, in BUYING A BETTER ENVIRONMENT 219,
225 (Erhard F. Joeres and Martin H. David eds., 1983).
206. See Watershed Framework, supra note 195, at 8-1.
207. See generally Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Case Study: Minnesota - Pollutant
Trading at Rahr Malting Co. (visited October 19, 2000) <http://www.pca.state.mn.us/hot/es-mn-
r.html>.
208. See generally N.C. Dept. Env’t, & Nat. Res.,  Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program
(visited October 19, 2000) <http://h20.enr.state.nc.us/nps/tarp.htm>.
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B.  The Barriers to Water Quality Trading
An effective trading system requires several fundamental ingre-
dients.  Among them are: first, a sound means of enforcement to en-
sure that commitments (load reductions) are adhered to; second, a le-
gal foundation that allows control flexibility sufficient to generate
financial gains to participation; and third, an administratively straight-
forward process for participating in the market.209  In the case of water
quality trading, many of these ingredients currently are missing.
Perhaps the greatest barrier to water quality trading is the sheer
complexity of factors that determine watershed loadings.  Even if a
source’s releases are perfectly known—a tall order in itself, particu-
larly for nonpoint sources—the transport and deposition of releases
are subject to numerous uncertainties relating to geography, hydrog-
raphy, and weather conditions.210  Once present in a waterbody, a
pollutant’s contribution to impairment is often a function of the wa-
terbody’s assimilative capacity (which is itself a function of rainfall),
temperature, salinity, acidity, and other localized chemical character-
istics.211 This produces several problems for a trading program be-
cause it makes it difficult to draw causal relationships between spe-
cific sources and water quality problems.  This causation problem
creates an obvious monitoring problem, unless releases can be moni-
tored at each potential source.  It also makes it nearly impossible to
quantitatively relate control practices (e.g., a reduction in fertilizer
application) to loadings.212  Establishing those relationships is neces-
sary to establish appropriate trading ratios.  Trading ratios account
for differences in the way control practices affect loadings.  For in-
stance, a pound of phosphorus applied to land far from a waterbody
will tend to contribute less to loadings than one applied close to the
waterbody.  If trading is allowed to occur between these two land-
owners, an appropriate trading ratio must be established to ensure
that the loading goal is met.  Specifically, if the landowner near the
waterbody is to increase its phosphorus applications, it must purchase
209. See generally Tripp & Dudek, supra note 203.
210. See generally Stephenson et al., supra note 198 at 413.  Nonpoint source load measure-
ment is considered by some to be a surmountable, and somewhat overblown, problem despite
these uncertainties.  Air emissions trading programs that face many similar challenges have had
a relatively successful history.
211. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 177.
212. See Stephen  R. Crutchfield et al., Feasibility of Point-Nonpoint Source Trading for
Managing Agricultural Pollutant Loadings to Coastal Waters, 30 WATER RESOURCES RES. 2825,
2825-26 (1994); Arun S. Malik et al., Point/Nonpoint Source Trading of Pollution Abatement, 75
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 959 (1993).
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reductions from its trading partner at a greater than 1-to-1 rate. The
complexity of watershed interactions does not permit the identifica-
tion and implementation of such trading ratios.
The complexity of watershed systems also contributes to the
overall monitoring problem.  End-of–pipe monitoring allows for rela-
tively precise monitoring of point source discharges.  In general, this
kind of precision is not available for nonpoint source loads.  The
EPA’s proposed rules include “margins of safety”213 to account for the
monitoring and causal uncertainties associated with nonpoint sources.
One counter-example is a nonpoint program for phosphorus re-
leases into Lake Okeechobee that relies on nonpoint source moni-
toring.214  It is the exception that proves the rule, however.  The moni-
toring takes advantage of the lake system’s artificially constructed
hydrography, including canals and pumping facilities.  Elsewhere,
monitoring strategies include proposals for remote-sensing via satel-
lite to determine compliance with land management and construction
requirements, such as buffers, cover crops, and irrigation systems.215
Finally, in some cases, quantitative modeling may be used to indi-
rectly estimate loadings.  Results from studies in one area can be used
to generalize the relationships between observable practices and typi-
cal effects in another.  While clearly imperfect, such tools may be the
most pragmatic means of injecting some knowledge of control-
loading relationships into a trading framework.
While the problems associated with nonpoint monitoring and
trading are significant, perhaps even more significant is that water
quality trading has to date failed to provide significant benefits even
among point sources.  The reasons for this are largely legal.  Technol-
ogy-based requirements (and their associated effluent standards) are
non-negotiable under the CWA.216  All point source dischargers must
213. This was particularly apparent in discussion of the new source offset rule.  “In such
cases,” according to the proposed rule, “the Director may require that a greater amount of re-
ductions must be realized and require an offset greater than one and a half to one.”  Revisions
to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and Federal Antidegradation
Policy In Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. at 46,058.  “When entering into an agreement with a nonpoint source, it may be
somewhat more difficult to determine exactly how much reduction will be achieved.”  Id.
214. See Stephenson et. al., supra note 198 for discussion of such monitoring options and
detailed discussion of their use in the Lake Okeechobee case and others.
215. Id.
216. See Kurt Stephenson et al., Toward an Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance
Trading System: Identifying the Statutory and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation, 5 The En-
vironmental Lawyer 775 (1999) (describing inflexibilities inherent in the CWA and their limiting
effect on watershed-based trading schemes).  See generally 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(1)-(2) (1994); 33
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install appropriate treatment mechanisms to achieve these required
discharge levels.  It is explicit EPA policy that trading participants can
in no way be absolved of this baseline technical requirement.217  While
this position may be understandable from an enforcement standpoint,
it significantly limits the flexibility over control options.  Limited
flexibility means that there are limited gains from trading.
Flexibility is also limited in a number of other ways.218  For in-
stance, point source effluent standards are industry-specific.  Since ef-
fluent standards are non-negotiable under the CWA, this implies that
no trading can occur across firms in different industries.  The practical
effect of this lack of flexibility is that a firm seeking a trade may find
no other eligible firms with whom to trade.219  In financial jargon, this
is equivalent to a lack of liquidity and undermines the ability of the
trading market to reveal and take advantage of cost savings.  Another
lack of flexibility arises from prohibitions on trading across pollutants.
For instance, under the withdrawn new-source offset proposal, the
EPA make clear that the offset had to be for the same pollutant.220
The informational, scientific, and legal barriers to water quality
trading are significant.  State experimentation with nonpoint pro-
grams and the development of analytical techniques to relate control
practices and loadings can be expected.  But the history of water
quality trading to date urges pessimism regarding the benefits likely
to be secured by sophisticated new trading schemes involving point
and nonpoint sources.  These schemes are largely untried and admin-
istratively complex.221  The search for cost-effective approaches to wa-
U.S.C. §1314(b) (1994); 33 U.S.C. §1316 (1994).
217. See Watershed Framework, supra note 195, 2-4.
218. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GAO/RCED-97-155,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHALLENGES FACING EPA’S EFFORTS TO REINVENT
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1997) (The EPA’s real or perceived inability to introduce
flexibilities into its highly media- and substance-specific regulatory programs is an ongoing
source of debate, generally).
219. See Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 95, 98 (1983) (detailing that one of the reasons Wisconsin’s Fox River trading program
failed to induce trades is that only a small number of firms were eligible).
220. “EPA recognizes that there may be circumstances where reasonable further progress
toward attaining water quality standards could best be served by allowing the Director the dis-
cretion to offset a new or expanded discharge of one pollutant with a load reduction of a differ-
ent pollutant for which the waterbody is also impaired.  EPA, however, is concerned with the
technical difficulties of implementing such an option.”  Revisions to the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System Program and Federal Antidegradation Policy In Support of Revi-
sions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,069.
221. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED 95-64,
EPA AND THE STATES – ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING
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ter quality improvement should not be allowed to rely exclusively on
trading.  Instead, a variety of more direct forms of regulation, such as
mandatory, enforceable BMPs, should also, and perhaps first, be ap-
plied to nonpoint sources.
C.  Allocations, Baselines, and Liability
One of the most important policy choices in a trading system is
the determination of who is initially responsible for pollutant reduc-
tions.  Consider two different trading schemes.  In the first, point
sources are responsible for pollutant reductions but can purchase re-
ductions from other point sources or from nonpoint sources.  In the
second, both point sources and nonpoint sources are responsible for
reductions, but can trade among themselves to achieve those reduc-
tions in the most cost-effective manner.  The federal TMDL program
leaves the choice of trading program entirely up to the states.  If
states are to introduce trading, this type of choice will have to be
made.  At a basic level, this choice is one over the distribution of the
costs of discharge reductions.  Both systems allow trading, so theo-
retically both will result in the same least-cost pattern of reductions
after trading has occurred.  They differ, however, in their allocation of
liability for reductions.  In the former case, liability lies with point
sources.  This means point sources must bear the costs of reducing
their own releases or pay nonpoint sources to reduce theirs.  In the
latter case, liability is shared.  Since nonpoint sources are themselves
subject to controls they must bear the costs of achieving reductions,
or purchase them elsewhere.
In addition to determining the initial liability allocation, any
trading system must also clearly define baseline (before-the-fact) dis-
charges.  This baseline is necessary if trading-driven discharge reduc-
tions are to be verified by regulators.  The artificial inflation of base-
lines is a problem that any trading system must address.  Polluters
selling credits have an incentive to inflate baseline discharges since in-
flation increases the amount of discharge reductions they can claim to
provide.  In the case of point sources, NPDES permits provide a veri-
fiable inventory of baseline releases.  Moreover, the point source
permitting process counteracts any incentive to over-state releases.
Under point source permitting, larger releases tend to imply more
RELATIONSHIP (1995).  It sobering to keep in mind the difficulties associated with even the
simplest monitoring and enforcement programs.  Enforcement of point source permitting is it-
self difficult.  According to one study, sixty-five percent of major facilities in Michigan were op-
erating with expired NPDES permits, while 150 new facilities waited for new, first-time permits.
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stringent, costly control technologies.  The nonpoint source situation
is quite different.  Not having been subject to permit requirements,
nonpoint sources lack an independently verifiable, and incentive-
compatible baseline.  Thus, there will be a problematic tendency for
such sources to initially over-estimate releases in an attempt to gener-
ate larger reduction credits.  One way to minimize this kind of prob-
lem is to initially allocate responsibility for reductions to nonpoint
sources.  With nonpoint discharge standards, nonpoint sources have a
countervailing incentive to under-claim contributions to loadings.  Of
course, the larger lesson is that there is the need for independent veri-
fication of releases.
The enforcement of a trading system is also directly related to
the allocation of liability.  For instance, consider the proposed rules’
new-source offset requirements.  This is a liability allocation akin to
the first situation considered above.  Point sources are liable for off-
setting reductions.  These reductions can be purchased from nonpoint
sources.  In event of non-compliance by a nonpoint source, the point
source is subject to enforcement action, not the nonpoint source.222
This is true under the EPA’s watershed trading framework as well.223
Consider comments on the EPA’s trading framework from one point
source which was concerned that “the lack of defined legislation and
regulatory controls of nonpoint sources may result in the point source
partner of a point source/nonpoint source effluent trading agreement
being held solely liable for violations of a water quality standard, even
though the source of the violation may be the nonpoint source.”224
However, any point-nonpoint trade presumably involves a contrac-
tual agreement between the sources that is independently enforceable
under contract law.  While agency enforcement action would be di-
rected at the point source, the point source could exercise its contrac-
tual remedy in order to secure the nonpoint source’s compliance with
contract terms.  Nevertheless, point source liability for nonpoint
source non-compliance increases the transaction costs associated with
trading.  This creates yet another argument for direct enforcement of
nonpoint controls by states.
222. As in Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and
Federal Antidegradation Policy In Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and
Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,072.
223. See Watershed Framework, supra note 195, at 7-18.
224. See Eastman Chemical Company, Original Comments on Watershed-Based Trading
<http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/tradecom/level3/ecc.html >.
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VI.  CONCLUSION
The Total Maximum Daily Load program will significantly alter
the politics, economics, and implementation of water quality regula-
tion.  Improved monitoring of ambient water quality conditions and
the accessible public documentation of impairments will focus gov-
ernment and public attention on water conditions that continue to be
problematic, even after twenty-five years of CWA regulation.  While
industrial point sources will no doubt continue to be vivid symbols of
the nation’s water pollution problems, this image is increasingly inap-
propriate.  Nonpoint agricultural, commercial, and urban sources,
while harder to caricature, are the rightful focus of dissatisfaction.
The most powerful aspect of the TMDL rules proposed by EPA is
that they are motivated by, and address, water quality issues created
by nonpoint sources.  The holistic, watershed-level analysis required
by the TMDL process will inevitably identify a larger sphere of often
unregulated discharge sources.  For these reasons alone, the TMDL
program is likely to promote significant, desirable changes in the tar-
gets and implementation of water quality regulation.  This article has
provided specific examples of TMDLs and the way in which they are
improving the public’s knowledge of impairments, motivating new
analytic techniques for the identification of sources, and promoting
experimentation with new water quality policies.  This movement to-
ward a water quality-driven approach marks a welcome, mature
phase of water quality regulation.
The changes initiated by the new TMDL rules present a host of
challenges.  These challenges call for tempered optimism and a will-
ingness to confront the significant implementation issues that will
arise from a TMDL-based regulatory system.  First, there are numer-
ous scientific difficulties associated with creating legally meaningful
causal links between dispersed nonpoint sources, their control activi-
ties, and changes in surface water pollutant loadings.  The causal link-
ages are poorly understood, and even when developed in the most
rigorous manner, only apply to the watershed for which they were
specifically developed.  The complex and idiosyncratic nature of pol-
lutant discharge, transport, and deposition processes means that the
technical underpinnings of TMDLs will be costly.
Administrative costs, together with resistance from currently un-
regulated sources, will act as a brake on state efforts to propose bold
new approaches to control activities. While water quality-based
regulation gives point sources an incentive to lobby for nonpoint con-
trols, organized nonpoint interests will undoubtedly continue to resist
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control requirements.  Federal authority to compel, and funding to
entice, nonpoint controls is limited.  The central role of state law and
location-specific political conditions mean that TMDL implementa-
tion will be variable across states.  Several issues demand greater legal
clarity: interjurisdictional conflict is likely, since downstream jurisdic-
tions will often inherit upstream water quality problems; and, air
deposition will present particularly knotty jurisdictional issues.  The
federal role in resolving these inevitable conflicts deserves attention.
In addition, the relationship between water quantity allocations and
water quality will demand a reconciliation between state quantity and
quality laws.
Finally, the rules’ emphasis on trading among point sources and
nonpoint sources should be viewed as a desirable aspiration, but also
as a distraction in the near-term.  Significant administrative, moni-
toring, and enforcement barriers to water quality trading exist.
Trading among point sources has to date failed to be practical.  Ex-
pansion of trading programs to nonpoint sources will only expand the
complexity of trading programs.  One of the many preconditions for
trading is that nonpoint sources be monitorable and that enforcement
mechanisms exist to compel corrective actions when nonpoint dis-
charge restrictions are violated.  Credibility, transparency, and en-
forceability are paramount if flexible environmental controls, such as
effluent trading, are to be realistically contemplated.  Regulatory, le-
gal, and technical efforts should first be directed toward this goal,
which is in itself a significant challenge.
Despite the challenges it presents, the TMDL approach marks
movement toward a welcome, mature phase of water quality regula-
tion.  The key feature of EPA’s proposed TMDL rules is that they are
motivated by, and address, water quality issues created by the widest
range of sources. The holistic, watershed-level analysis required by
the TMDL process will inevitably identify a larger sphere of often un-
regulated discharge sources.  For these reasons alone, the TMDL
program is likely to promote significant, desirable changes in the im-
plementation of water quality regulation.
